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ABSTRACT 
 
A review of modern police history shows the trend of increased division of labor 
within police agencies. However, police organizations are often criticized for creating 
specialized police units when they are faced with specific problems or are not effectively 
tackling local problems. Other challenges from within the profession include potential 
inter-unit conflicts or indifference of officers from other units that may hinder program 
implementation by specialized units. The present study looked into the changing 
characteristics of specialized units within police departments between 2000 and 2007. 
This research also examined whether creation of specialized community policing units 
(CP Units) influences the community policing activities performed by police agencies.  
The results show that wide variations exist in the operation of specialized police 
units among police agencies. Specifically, the increase of some specialized units (e.g., 
cyber-crime, hate crime, missing child, and terrorism units) seems to reflect social 
changes and police departments’ responses to tackle diverse problems arising from such 
changes. Also, linear panel analysis indicates that police agencies with CP Units were 
more likely to produce outputs in each element of community policing (i.e., community 
engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation). In other words, the 
creation of specialized units may lead to the increase of outputs that the units are intended 
and designed to produce. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In The Wealth of Nations, one of the most influential works of the 18
th
 century, 
Smith (1902 [1776]) wrote extensively about the concept of division of labor. For 
example, he demonstrated that productivity measured by the number of pins 
manufactured per day in a workshop increased 240 times after dividing the process into 
18 separate jobs as compared to when a single worker produced pins one at a time. 
Smith maintained that significant improvement of productivity through the 
division of labor is due to three factors: (1) enhancement of dexterity; (2) time savings 
from not shifting from one stage to another; and (3) use of “proper machinery.” First, 
enhancement of dexterity refers to the increase in sophistication in skills acquired through 
repetition (i.e., practice). Second, workers can be more effective by eliminating 
unnecessary processes caused by transferring from one stage to another. Third, use of 
proper machinery refers to the choice of appropriate tools to achieve organizational goals.  
Smith’s analysis is based on observations from the manufacturing sector. 
However, the division of labor principles strategically divides tasks among team 
members to achieve their goals (Letterer, 1973). Thus, these concepts can also be applied 
to many organizations—public or private, profit or non-profit, and service- or 
manufacturing-oriented—including police departments.  
The principles of division of labor were later expanded by Weber (1947) as part 
of his influential work in changing how organizations are structured. Weber (1947:219) 
argued that in organizations where division of labor is realized, “different persons 
perform different types of work and that these are combined in the service of common 
ends, with each other and with the non-human means of production, in the most varied 
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ways.” Therefore, work is divided not only among organizational members but also 
among various types of technology to achieve a common goal. Division of labor is now 
one of the core elements of bureaucracy that make it “capable of attaining the highest 
degree of efficiency” (Weber, 1968:223). Weber believed that division of labor was a key 
factor of bureaucracy that made it superior to other types of organizations (March and 
Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1961).  
After World War I, division of labor became “a basic principle,” with the support 
from the scientific management approach suggested by Taylor (Etzioni, 1964:22). Taylor 
(1947) argued that investigation and division of work processes can greatly increase 
production efficiency in organizational outcomes.  
A review of modern police history also shows division of labor within the 
organizational structure. For instance, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the first 
modern police organization in the world, was established in London, England in 1829. At 
that time, the department had about 1,000 officers and was composed of eight divisions 
(MPS, 2012). Less than two centuries later, the same police agency employs 32,370 
sworn officers and 13,970 civilian staff. In addition, the organizational chart of the MPS 
reveals a high-level of specialization not unlike large private organizations (MPS, 2012).
1
  
Organizational complexity is similar throughout police departments in the United 
States. As an example, the organizational chart of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police 
Department shows that the Bureau of Community Policing (BOCP) provides patrol 
                                                          
1
 A distinction can be made between division of labor as a general concept and specialization as a particular 
form of division of labor. Organization theorists as well as policing scholars have used multiple terms when 
addressing division of labor including “specialization,” “division of work,” “functional differentiation,” or 
“horizontal differentiation” (e.g., Hall et al., 1967; Letterer, 1973; Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000; Parks, 
Mastrofski, DeJong, and Gray, 1999; Pfeffer, 1982; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Because these terms have 
been used interchangeably in prior research, this dissertation will also treat them as referring to the same 
concept.  
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service through nine separate Districts (Figure 1.1). Under the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation and Support (BOIS), there are 19 specialized units. The Bureau of 
Professional Standards (BOPS) has five units, and the Bureau of Auxiliary Service 
(BOAS) has eight units. Under chief of staff, five separate units are also in operation.  
Such a fine-grained degree of police specialization is a relatively new 
phenomenon. During the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century, police departments did 
not have as many specialized units as they do now (Reiss, 1992). As will be discussed in 
more detail later, police departments in the United States have undergone increasing 
specialization of their organizational structures since the late 19
th
 century (Mastrofski and 
Willis, 2010).  
However, police organizations are often criticized for creating specialized police 
units when they are faced with specific problems or are not effectively tackling local 
problems (Moore, 1992). Scholars have tended to regard police departments’ dependence 
on establishing specialized units as a temporary strategy to calm criticisms related to 
agencies’ incompetence in solving local crime problems. That is, creation of specialized 
units has been considered a transitory response to relieve public attack on police 
departments, rather than reflecting a result of rational organizational decision-making to 
increase effectiveness and efficiency (Crank and Langworthy, 1992). For instance, 
research has shown that police departments set up gang units following pressure from 
communities and politicians, not from the necessity to proactively tackle gang problems 
in a more efficacious manner (Katz and Webb, 2004).  
Despite the prevalence of specialized units within police agencies, scholars have 
devoted little effort to studying the effectiveness of such units. Some researchers have 
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studied the processes by which police organizations create specialized units (e.g., Katz, 
2001), but only a few studies have examined how such units affect the outputs of police 
departments (e.g., Maguire, 2009). Therefore, there is limited understanding of how 
specialization affects organizational behavior overall.  
Researchers have only recently started to investigate factors that affect the 
structure of police organizations and the effectiveness of different structural 
configurations. These discussions tend to be normative or descriptive rather than 
empirical (Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Maguire and Uchida, 2000), which is not 
unique to studies on police departments (Scott, 1975). Normative theories can sometimes 
be useful because researchers can identify factors that describe variations among police 
agencies (Langworthy, 1986). Yet, in many cases, normative theories are problematic 
because they do not try to explain variations in police organizations and discuss 
variations from predetermined criteria as “anomalies” or “suboptimal” (Langworthy, 
1986:12).  
In addition, when examining change within police organizations, most researchers 
look to the overall departmental structure. For instance, Langworthy (1986) investigated 
the determinants of five dimensions of formal organizational structure: administrative 
overhead, and spatial, occupational, hierarchical, and functional differentiation. 
Organizational size was found to be correlated with spatial differentiation (i.e., the degree 
of an agency’s geographic dispersion), while technology was significantly related to 
functional differentiation (i.e., the degree of an agency’s task division).  
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Figure 1.1. Organizational Chart of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department 
 
Source: Website of the Metropolitan Police Department, City of St. Louis, MO (http://www.slmpd.org)  
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Maguire (2003) later expanded upon the study of Langworthy (1986) and 
extended the work to investigate the causal linkage between context, complexity, and 
control of police organizations. However, Langworthy (1986) and Maguire (2003) both 
treated specialization as a dependent variable, not an independent variable. Therefore, 
while their work is useful for understanding the conceptualization and antecedents of 
specialization, it is not useful for thinking about the effects of specialization. 
  Some scholars have examined the formation of specialized units within police 
agencies (e.g., Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002). Whether such units 
produce the intended outputs, however, has not received much scholarly attention, with 
the exception of Maguire (2009). As Klinger (2004:127) suggested, “Those seeking to 
make the police more efficient . . . have argued that increasing the occupational and 
functional complexity of police agencies would allow departments to commit specially 
trained officers and units to specific problems.” Nevertheless, investigation of the causal 
mechanism between structural changes (i.e., creation of specialized units) and 
performance change has not satisfactorily drawn a firm conclusion (Klinger, 2004). 
The association between the establishment of specialized units and outputs also 
can be understood in terms of its structure-strategy relationship. In fact, the relationship 
between structure and strategy is one of the most investigated and controversial issues 
among organization theorists. To date, however, the causal mechanisms have not been 
identified between the two variables (e.g., Amburgey and Dacin, 1994; Hall and Saias, 
1980). Thus, examining whether specialized units affect organizational outputs of police 
agencies may provide insight into the causal association between structure and strategy.  
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More importantly, the recent trend of specialization in police departments needs 
to be considered in conjunction with the introduction of a new policing approach that has 
been adopted by police agencies across the country, community policing. Community 
policing has gained widespread popularity since the 1970s and has dramatically changed 
the way police agencies operate and structure their organizations. Community policing 
approaches encourage police to help their communities engage in local policing and to 
adopt a problem-solving approach in daily job performance. This community-focused 
perspective encourages departmental restructuring so that every rank-and-file officer can 
engage in community policing activities. Specifically, community policing proponents 
advocate despecialization of police organizations (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). Thus, 
the popularity of community policing approaches by police organizations contrasts with 
departments’ increasing reliance on specialized units. In other words, conflicting attitudes 
among scholars and practitioners may exist regarding the appropriate organizational 
design after the introduction of community policing strategies. Accordingly, investigating 
how police agencies handle the conflicting challenges and demands between the ideal 
scenario (i.e., community policing approach) and the current reality (i.e., specialization of 
the organizations) is critical.  
In this context, the present study investigates whether creation of community 
policing units alters the community policing activities performed by police agencies. 
More specifically, the goal of this dissertation is to examine how specialized police units 
affect outputs of police agencies. Therefore, the existence of a community policing unit is 
a key independent variable in explaining output changes in the area of community 
policing. Unlike prior research, however, the current study introduces three distinct 
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elements of community policing to determine whether specialized units play a similar 
role in each element of community policing program implementation. Another innovation 
in this study is in the analysis of longitudinal data to examine the causal relationship 
between creating units and their effects on outputs.  
This study will expand the understanding of community policing in two novel 
ways. First, multi-wave data are used to track specialized units within police departments. 
Prior research has mostly relied on a single wave of data. When multi-wave data have 
been used, studies tended to describe changes (e.g., Maguire, 1997). In contrast, this 
research looks to explain the effect of specialized units on the change of outputs using 
panel data. That is, this dissertation is more focused on the causal association between the 
creation of a specialized unit and its outputs. Because cross-sectional data can pose some 
challenges in identifying causality among variables, longitudinal panel data are used to 
investigate the relationship.  
Second, this dissertation measures the output changes of different community 
policing elements (i.e., multiple dependent variables) in order to track different functional 
consequences of community policing. One of the most frequently investigated areas in 
the policing literature, community policing programs have been extensively studied, but 
the application of diverse criteria and approaches of different investigators has made it 
challenging to compare results across studies. The present study attempts to resolve this 
confusion and increase external validity of its results by using three distinct elements of 
community policing—community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational 
transformation—as three separate dependent variables. This approach will determine 
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whether units devoted to community policing have any effect on the outputs produced by 
those police agencies.  
 
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
The remainder of the dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter 2 
provides a review of the literature on specialization of organizations. The chapter begins 
with an overview of research on organizational specialization and expands to the analysis 
of policing research on specialized units within police agencies. The discussion includes 
reasons why specialization is an important issue in examining police organizations. 
Chapter 3 discusses the reasons why community policing units and community 
policing activities were chosen for this study. It is crucial to understand the impact of 
community policing on American police organizations. Thus, the chapter provides a brief 
introduction to key elements of community policing. More specifically, it discusses the 
relationship between community policing approaches and specialization (or 
despecialization) within police departments.  
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods employed in the dissertation. The 
chapter explains the relative strengths and weaknesses of datasets used in this field 
research. In addition, it discusses general issues involved in variable construction and 
defines how the specific dependent and independent variables were constructed for this 
study. Because my research is on the causal association between the creation of 
community policing units and outputs from community policing activities, I will perform 
a linear panel analysis. The rationale for choosing this statistical technique will be 
elaborated in this chapter.  
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The results of the analyses will be provided in Chapter 5. Descriptive statistics 
will show how numerous specialized units emerged and changed in the first decade of the 
21
st
 century. Further, linear panel analysis results will show the causal relationship 
between the creation of specialized community policing units and community policing 
program outputs.  
Lastly, a discussion of pragmatic implications will be presented in Chapter 6, 
along with limitations of the present study and a proposed agenda for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2. SPECIALIZATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
Specialization has evolved into a key feature of most organizational structures 
(Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000). Specialization is characterized by the establishment of 
specialized units, or “specialist units,” within police agencies, each devoted to a different 
aspect of the organization’s goals (Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000). Similarly, Maguire 
(2009:45) defined specialization of police organizations as “the division of work into 
defined tasks and the assignment of those tasks to functionally distinct organizational 
units.”  
As discussed in the previous chapter, police administrators have relied 
increasingly on the creation of specialized units to address local problems, but 
researchers have placed less emphasis on the organizational outputs resulting from 
specialization. That is, specialization has been merely one part in the discussion of police 
departments (e.g., Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003). Recently, a few researchers have 
paid more attention to the process by which specialized units are created (e.g., Katz, 
2002), but studies have generally overlooked how such specialized police units play a 
role in producing outputs, with a notable exception of Maguire (2009). Put another way, 
specialization has been mostly used as a dependent variable, not as an independent 
variable in explaining organizational outputs. Therefore, although most police 
departments operate a variety of specialized units, we have a limited understanding of the 
outputs produced by such units, as well as of the scope of functional specialization.  
It is critical to investigate the role of specialized units within police departments 
for three reasons. First, establishment of specialized units impacts resource allocation. As 
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such, it can become a source of conflict among different units, which leads to problems 
of coordination among units (Clift, 1970; March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1961). As 
will be shown later, early policing scholars cautioned that police leaders should not rely 
on specialized units more than necessary because of the cost involved in the coordination 
process across units (e.g., Wilson, 1973). Thus, as a first step to examine the role of 
specialized units, this dissertation will examine whether police departments that establish 
units to perform specific tasks are more likely to increase outputs.  
Second, whether such units play a role in producing outputs related to community 
policing is not clear. Research has largely ignored the causal relation between the 
creation of specialized units and the outputs generated by them. Also, as will be discussed 
later, some studies (e.g., Rutherford, Blevins, and Lord, 2008) have tended to investigate 
outcomes (e.g., reduction of crime or fear of crime, increase of satisfaction with police, 
increase of arrest rates, etc.) and their correlates. In contrast, outputs resulting from 
organizational inputs, however, have not received much scholarly attention. Only a few 
studies have provided a cross-sectional analysis of a certain type of specialized unit (i.e., 
gang unit), but the effect of such specialized units on outputs has not been explored (e.g., 
Langton, 2010).  
Finally, research on specialized units can provide insight regarding the association 
between organizational structure and strategies. For instance, are organizational 
structures antecedents of strategies, or do strategies follow structure? This question has 
been fundamental in organization research (see Amburgey and Dacin, 1994; Hall and 
Saias, 1980) and causal analysis of specialized units and their activities may provide an 
answer. Research on the effects of specialized units can also provide a better 
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understanding of how police organizations function. Consequently, police leaders can 
benefit from this research because the results may have implications for designing the 
structure of police organizations to produce intended outputs.  
This chapter will provide a brief overview of specialization and the reasons for 
specialization within organizations writ large. In addition, I will discuss several key 
features of specialization and identify types of specialization. Next, the circumstances 
under which specialization is a sound response to organizational goals will be suggested 
and the effect of specialization will be examined. Lastly, I will review policing research 
that investigates specialization within police departments with special attention paid to 
the effect of specialized units on organizational outputs.  
 
SPECIALIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONS 
As briefly noted in Chapter 1, division of labor within an organization can 
contribute to a great increase of productivity. Discussion on the division of labor, 
however, has not been limited to the realm of formal organizations (Filley, House, and 
Kerr, 1976). Rather, works on division of labor have identified how this process affects 
society beyond any single organization (Durkheim, 1933).  
It is worth noting at this point that the term “specialization” in this study refers to 
specialization of task, not of people. Task specialization, according to Thompson 
(1961:25), refers to “making activities more specific,” while specialization of people 
means “the adaptation of the individual to the conditions of his existence.” Thus, in an 
organization where tasks are specialized, workers are not necessarily specialized only 
14 
 
because they can perform such specialized tasks, given that workers easily can replace 
fellow workers.  
Classical organization theories propose a basic principle in specializing 
organizational tasks: organization members need to be grouped together by the purpose, 
process, clientele, or geographical area of their tasks (Etzioni, 1964). However, Etzioni 
(1964) argued that organizations often do not necessarily follow these principles and 
numerous other factors may affect how organizations divide their tasks (e.g., culture, 
environment, political settings, resources, etc.). Similarly, in analyzing the interactions 
between organizations and their surrounding environments, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
proposed that organizations differentially create specialized units to respond to 
environmental pressure and demands. In other words, not all specialized units have the 
same structural features. Instead, specialized units are created and function differently 
depending on the environment and required tasks to perform.  
Blau (1970) suggested that specialization, or functional differentiation, is one of 
four dimensions of formal organizations. The other three are spatial, occupational, and 
hierarchical differentiation. Regarding division of labor, Blau (1970:203) argued that:  
The division of labor typifies the improvement in performance attainable through 
division. The more completely simple tasks are separated from various kinds of 
complex ones, the easier it is for unskilled employees to perform the routine 
duties and for skilled employees to acquire the specialized training and experience 
to perform the different complex ones. Further subdivision of responsibilities 
occurs among functional divisions, enabling each one to concentrate on certain 
kinds of work.  
 
 In short, from small workshops during the industrial revolution era to very 
complex modern companies, specialization has become a key feature of many 
organizations. Specialization has been hailed as an organizational tool that can 
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dramatically increase efficiency and effectiveness. Specific reasons for such 
specialization, however, warrant further discussion. 
 
REASONS FOR THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
Why do organizations apply the principle of division of labor in their structure? 
Put simply, why do organizations divide their functions into smaller tasks? Based on the 
study of 53 employment security agencies in the United States, Blau (1970) found that 
organizational size was positively correlated with functional differentiation. That is, as 
the number of employees increased, organizations were likely to have more subdivisions 
and distinct positions. However, Blau (1970) also maintained that the rate of increase in 
differentiation slows as the size increases.  
Daft and Bradshaw (1980) later claimed that the effect of organization size on 
specialization is not as straightforward as proposed by Blau (1970). They asserted that 
organization members make conscious decisions on structural differentiation—horizontal 
differentiation was their term—for a variety of reasons that are independent of size. For 
instance, Thompson (1961) posited that “a stable environment and a guarantee of 
continuity of function” is required for an organization to specialize its tasks.  
 More specific reasons for the division of work were suggested by Litterer (1973). 
First of all, the knowledge and specialty that a person can have is necessarily limited. For 
instance, one person cannot achieve the goal of manufacturing cars. Lots of experts, from 
engineering to design, need to be involved in the separate stages of making a car. 
Likewise, a single medical doctor cannot provide numerous medical services ranging 
from basic treatments to performing complex surgeries. Similarly, it could be extremely 
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difficult for one police officer to provide patrol, traffic, homicide investigation, and 
terrorist intelligence gathering within a single department. Thus, each worker can focus 
on his/her limited scope of tasks by dividing works into smaller components and 
specializing duties.  
Second, as Smith (1902 [1776]) argued, far more output is possible through 
division of labor. As mentioned above, workers can produce many more pins in a given 
periods of time when they divide the processes of pin making. Repeating the same tasks, 
accumulation of knowledge, and training through trial-and-error improve the productivity 
of output possible for workers and yield products that are more standardized in design 
and quality. 
Lastly, different aspects of tasks can be performed at the same time, which 
Litterer (1973) described as “concurrent operations.” For instance, in making pins, the 
straightening, pointing, and twisting of wires can be carried out at the same time. Without 
the division of labor, workers have to start from straightening to twisting wires in an 
orderly manner. Organizations that have a high degree of specialization, on the other 
hand, can carry out numerous jobs at the same time, which leads to increased 
performance efficiency.  
 
HOW TO DIVIDE WORK 
Dividing the component steps of a task and allocating these tasks to appropriate 
staff members is challenging for many organizations, partly because division of labor 
often requires organizations to invest vast resources, like machinery, personnel, and 
preparation for operating procedures. Thus, Scott (2003:234) noted that “one of the most 
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difficult and critical of all decisions facing an organization is how work is to be 
divided—what tasks are to be assigned to what roles, roles to work units, and units to 
departments.” In fact, as is shown later, the limited research on police specialized units 
has been focused on this niche issue of the specialization process (e.g., Giblin, 2006; 
Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, Roncek, 2002).  
Departmentalization reflects how division of labor is expressed in the structure of 
complex and formal organizations. Departmentalization is defined as “how jobs may be 
grouped together into work units in order to meet individual or organizational goals” 
(Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976). Divisions, bureaus, departments, or units are some 
examples of these groupings. Examining how organizations departmentalize their 
functions can reveal how work is divided to achieve the goals.  
Filley, House, and Kerr (1976) argued that departmentalization can be divided 
into two forms: goal-oriented and process-oriented. In goal-oriented departmentalization, 
organizations form divisions, bureaus, or units based on products or geographic areas to 
achieve their goals. For instance, units in several different geographic areas can have 
their own staff to accomplish their organizational goals. Organizations can proactively 
implement problem-solving activities or provide services to their customers. Also, each 
unit can function autonomously with its own skills and personnel to achieve goals. A 
disadvantage, however, is that duplication of resources among units may be inevitable 
due to replication of the same infrastructure in different units (e.g., administrative 
assistants, office facilities, etc.).  
On the other hand, process-oriented or functional departmentalization focuses on 
how organizations utilize their limited resources more efficiently. Organizations structure 
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divisions, bureaus, or units based on processes to accomplish overall goals. For instance, 
motor companies structure their organizations by creating sales, engineering, and 
manufacturing departments. Thus, each department is grouped based on specialty and 
resources can be maximized.  
Examples of goal- and process-oriented types of departmentalization are 
presented in Figure 2.1. A mixture of both goal-oriented and functional 
departmentalization is adopted by many organizations (Child, 1984). When organizations 
focus on the efficient use of resources in a stable environment, functional 
departmentalization is preferred (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976). 
It is worth noting that division of labor is not ideal for every situation (Letterer, 
1973). The following factors are necessary for division of labor to be effective in an 
economic sense. First, a high volume of work is needed. When similar work demand is 
repeated for a relatively long time, division of labor is recommended. For instance, if 
customer complaints keep increasing, a department store may want to create a new unit 
solely responsible for training their personnel to interact skillfully with customers.  
Second, stability of volume and demand is an important factor in considering 
division of work. When there is a temporarily high volume of work, then division of 
work may not be necessary. In the example of the department store, if the complaints 
suddenly decrease, then the division of personnel training and evaluation may not be 
warranted.  
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Figure 2.1. Goal-Oriented and Process-Oriented Departmentalization  
 
    
  a. Goal Emphasis       b. Process Emphasis 
 
Source: Filley, House, and Kerr (1976:362)  
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Third, a change in technology or strategy within the organizations may call for 
specialized staffing. For instance, the introduction of a self-payment system in a retail 
store may require a specialized unit that can maintain the technological equipment.  
 
EFFECTS OF DIVISION OF LABOR 
Research has revealed that increased division of labor within organizations can 
have several consequences on organizational structure and functions. First, specialization 
is claimed to decrease the scope of responsibilities performed by units or departments, 
which leads to ease in carrying out tasks and increased productivity (Blau, 1970; 
Mintzberg, 1979). However, research also shows mixed results regarding improved 
performance (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976). 
Second, the division of labor influences the solidarity among division members. 
Blau (1970:217) argued that increased differentiation, or division of labor, increased 
“inter-unit heterogeneity.” Employees expressed more solidarity among colleagues 
within the same subunits and had more potential for conflicts and indifference with 
people outside of the units. In addition, the number and characteristics of interactions 
among workers can be different depending on the division of labor or work design 
(Letterer, 1973). Letterer argued that members within the same unit tend to have their 
own subgoals and social norms, which leads to indifference to the overall organizational 
goals and cooperation with other units. Diverse social systems can emerge in different 
units and this diversity can become an obstacle to the fulfillment of overarching 
organizational goals. Ultimately, division of labor can affect the job satisfaction of 
employees (Letterer, 1973; Thompson, 1961). 
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Third, the division of labor leads to the complexity of organizational structure 
(Blau, 1970). Child (1973) argued that specialization and expertise reflect organizational 
complexity. Relatedly, structural complexity may lead to conflict among different 
divisions or departments. Dalton and Watton (1967) asserted that task specialization can 
lead to conflict as well as collaboration among different units because of (1) access to 
limited resources; (2) differentiated status (power, prestige, etc.) and role dissatisfactions 
in organizations; and (3) ambiguities of tasks and inadequate personal skill and traits.  
Finally, the division of labor is associated with coordination within organizations. 
The existence of specialized units may lead to conflicts (Mintzberg, 1979) or 
interdependencies (March and Simon, 1958) among units. Accordingly, as specialization 
within an organization increases, the necessity for the coordination and communication 
among different subunits also increases (Blau, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979; Pfeffer, 1982; 
Thompson, 1961). In fact, one of the reasons that the rate of structural differentiation of 
formal organizations decelerates as size increases is the necessity of coordination among 
different subunits (Blau, 1970).  
Similarly, the increased division of labor also leads to the increased need for 
administrative management and supervision (Blau, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979). In other 
words, as the number of subunits within an organization increases, the organization needs 
more structural mechanisms and personnel to take care of the conflicts and coordination 
among different subunits. Critical administrative tools for coordination and management 
of conflict among subunits are standardization and documentation of work process and 
procedures (Child, 1973). That is, to prevent and solve the possible conflicts among 
subunits, organizations tend to set up a standardized process describing tasks performed 
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by each subunit. This documentation ultimately leads to the increase of standardization of 
organizations.  
 
POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS 
Specialization marks one of the most common features of current police 
organizations. In this section, I present research on specialized units within police 
organizations, specifically focusing on the creation of specialized units because a new 
addition (i.e., establishment of a separate unit) to organizational structure is a key 
indicator of the level of police agencies’ specialization (Wilson, 1973).  
POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS 
Reiss (1992) argued that due to bureaucratization, police departments in the 
United Sates have undergone dramatic changes since the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries. 
First, police departments became separated from the influence of local politicians. 
Second, police agencies became hierarchical organizations, leading to an increased 
number of staff officers. Third, police departments introduced merit systems in hiring and 
promoting personnel. Last, and most closely related to this study, bureaucratization has 
led to the complexity characterized by the growth of specialized units within police 
agencies. In fact, Mastrofski and Willis (2010:69) asserted that the bureaucratization of 
police organizations has led to “increased complexity in the form of the division of labor 
among growing numbers of specialist units.”  
Bureaucratization, however, is considered to include specialization. For instance, 
Weber (1947:330) argued that “a specified sphere of competence” may be one of the key 
characteristics of bureaucratic organizations: 
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This involves (a) a sphere of obligations to perform functions that have been 
marked off as part of a systematic division of labor. (b) The provision of the 
incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions. (c) That the 
necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to 
definite conditions. A unit exercising authority which is organized in this way will 
be called an ‘administrative organ.’ 
 
Thus, it may be tautological to suggest that bureaucratization led to the 
specialization of police works. Because the goal of this study is not to dispute such 
arguments, it may be enough to suggest that the aforementioned works clearly 
substantiate the case that police departments have realized a high level of division of 
labor since the late 19
th
 century. Skogan and Frydl (2004:176) described the 
specialization of police tasks as “one of the hallmarks of the professional or advanced 
police organization.”  
In one of the classics in police literature, Wilson (1968) posited that specialized 
units can play a role in deciding whether police organizations would be likely to follow a 
watchman, legalistic, or service style. Wilson (1968:155) stated that: 
Having a minimum number of specialized or special-duty squads has an important 
implication for organizational behavior: there will be few places to which one can 
be transferred in the department and few incentives to seek transfer there. 
(emphasis original) 
 
In other words, specialized units are an organizational tool that makes police 
officers behave differently by providing different career opportunities. Rather than riding 
in a patrol vehicle for a long time, officers would work hard to get a “cushy” job in 
another unit or division. In contrast, patrol officers do not have a reason to work hard if 
there are not many career opportunities in specialized units. Wilson (1968:155) also 
maintained that operation of specialized units can show the styles of police agencies: “an 
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unspecialized department tends to be a watchman-like department that in turn tends to 
resist specialization.” Walker and Katz (2012) similarly suggested that assignment to 
specialized units is used by police administrators to give an opportunity to develop 
officers’ careers within their organizations. According to this argument, specialization is 
merely one of many personnel management tools.  
  
CREATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS 
Why do police departments create specialized units? Is it critical or even 
necessary for police agencies to have specialized units? Although the answers seem to be 
obvious, these questions are important in understanding how police organizations 
structure their agencies and how they function. Specifically, considering the 
heterogeneity of police departments across the United States (Walker and Katz, 2010), 
understanding the operational differences of specialized units among departments is 
essential to paint a clear picture of how police perform their tasks in different 
surroundings. For instance, Walker and Katz (1995) investigated how police departments 
address bias crimes. Out of 16 police agencies, only four departments had separate bias 
crimes units. Six agencies did not have units, while the remaining six departments had 
specialized personnel or procedures to take care of bias crimes. In other words, agencies 
take a different approach to tackle similar tasks. Thus, Walker and Katz (1995:33) argued 
that: 
Perhaps the most important factor related to the effective administration of a bias 
crime unit is the real extent of a department’s commitment to the general problem 
of bias crime enforcement as perceived by the officers assigned to the unit.  
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It is also worth noting that earlier texts on police administration provide 
normative explanations on this issue. That is, the old idea of a police officer as a 
uniformed generalist suggests that a police officer should be able to address a wide 
variety of issues rather than referring clients to specialized units in the organization. For 
instance, Clift (1970:34) noted: 
In evaluating specialization, it can neither be said that it is wholly bad or wholly 
good. Certainly, some specialization must be carried on, especially when duties 
can no longer be performed as a routine function. This is to say that we should 
never specialize when generalization is possible.  
 
Recently, numerous theoretical and empirical approaches have been taken to 
explain why and how police departments create specialized units within their 
organizations. One of the most prominent perspectives is rooted in institutional theory. 
According to this approach, the establishment of specialized units within police 
departments largely depends upon the availability of resources and willingness of police 
organizations to portray themselves as crime fighters to satisfy external demands. Thus, 
technical efficiency and effectiveness sometimes do not constitute the primary motivation 
for establishing new specialized units (Maguire and King, 2007). 
Crank and Langworthy (1992) utilized this perspective to explore the creation of 
specialized police units. As predicted by institutional theory, police organizations create 
specialized units to alleviate the pressure of external stakeholders who worry about crime 
in the community, not from rational decision-making to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness of organizational outputs. Thus, Crank and Langworthy (1992:344) argued 
that: 
The specialization itself is perceived by the sovereigns as essential to the “war 
against crime.” That is, because of the influence of these sovereigns, 
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organizational structure has elaborated in the direction of specialized crime-
fighting units.  
 
 There has been some empirical support for this institutional perspective. For 
instance, Katz (2001) examined how and why police departments established gang units. 
By testing institutional theory in explaining the establishment of gang units, Katz (2001: 
65) argued that “various powerful elements within the community” drive police 
organizations to set up separate gang units to tackle problems. For instance, the African-
American community supports police agencies’ decisions to operate gang units to address 
the gang problems of African-American neighborhoods.  
More importantly, Katz (2001) revealed that such gang specialty subunits 
structured and operated their units based on the expectations of their institutional 
environment rather than on effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, the activities and 
structures of gang units follow the beliefs and expectation of members of police 
organizations and external constituents. For instance, gang units form partnerships with 
community groups, schools, and other criminal justice agencies, and by doing so, the 
units maintain their legitimacy and gain support. In short, some specialized police units 
are created not from rational decision-making by the police organization but as a 
response to the external pressures to tackle community problems.  
Maguire and Gantley (2009a) suggested that the creation of subunits is a metric of 
an organization’s specialization. They proposed three reasons for establishing specialized 
units (in this case, community policing units): (1) limited time to implement community 
policing activities; (2) the influence of external funding; and (3) as a symbolic gesture to 
demonstrate action to outsiders. Though based on observing specialization of community 
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policing, these arguments can also be applied to other areas of policing. First, as the 
demand for police attention to specific matters increases (e.g., gang activity, cyber-crime, 
terrorism, etc.), agencies find that providing appropriate responses is difficult within 
existing structures. Thus, police leaders decide to create discrete units with separate 
personnel and resources to address new problems. Second, funding agencies tend to 
provide financial assistance to agencies with specialized units (Maguire and Gantley, 
2009a). Third, creation of a specialized unit sends a strong message to the community 
that the police department is serious about the problems that the new unit was developed 
to address.  
Another study by Katz, Maguire, and Roncek (2002) examined factors that 
affected the creation of gang units. This research was based on the assumption that 
“police gang units represent a new and concentrated form of formal social control exerted 
predominantly over young gang-aged males, often minorities” (Katz, Maguire, and 
Roncek, 2002:492). They tested three distinct theories in explaining how and why police 
agencies establish gang units: contingency, social threat, and resource dependency 
theory. Their sample included 285 municipal police departments that had 100 or more 
sworn officers. They found that variables related to contingency theory did not 
significantly predict gang units (Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002). That is, crime rates 
were not predictive of the decision to create gang units. The percentage of Hispanics in 
the population and the level of external funding were significant predictive factors. In 
short, research shows that police departments create separate gang units from the 
concerns of social threat in their communities rather than from the rational calculation of 
criminal problems.  
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Giblin (2006) also explored the factors that affect the creation of crime analysis 
units and found supporting evidence for Katz (2001) and Katz, Maguire, and Roncek 
(2002): police agencies establish crime analysis units due to institutional factors. In 
Giblin’s study, the institutional factor was the pressure of the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. He also found that police department size 
was positively correlated with crime analysis units (Giblin, 2006).  
 
EFFECTS OF POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS 
 One area that has not received much attention in the discussion of police 
specialization is the effect of specialized units on organizational outputs. Researchers 
have not provided a clear answer as to whether or not specialized police units change the 
output of police organizations. Therefore, this study specifically focuses on the outputs, 
not the outcomes, of specialized units.  
Policing research has tended to look at outcomes of operations or program 
implementation. While outputs refer to the completed products of an organization’s 
activities, outcomes are desired goals that such programs intend to achieve. In other 
words, “outcomes are not what the program itself did but the consequences of what the 
program did” (Hatry, 2006:17, emphasis original). Reduced crime rates or increased 
arrest rates can be some examples of outcomes resulting from increased foot patrol. In 
this case, the coverage on foot patrol, amount of time spent on foot patrol, or number of 
patrolling officers can be examples of outputs.  
Again, this study is interested in whether the creation of specialized units affects 
the outputs, i.e., the causal association between specialization and outputs. Understanding 
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outputs can show the more direct and detailed consequence of specialized units within 
police agencies. Simply looking at the outcomes of a program may exclude the possibility 
that different outputs can lead to the same outcomes. Therefore, though a focus on 
outputs may not reveal much regarding the achievement of organizational goals (Hatry, 
2006), it surely helps us to identify how police agencies are different in program 
implementation. 
Some may take increased outputs for granted once specialized units are in 
operation. Managers in charge of specialized units may want to produce as many outputs 
as possible to meet the organizational expectation. Extra personnel or funding may be 
available to produce multiple outputs. However, as Etzioni (1964:32) stated, “the highest 
specialization is by no means the most efficient form of division of labor.” In other 
words, specialization does not necessarily lead to the increase of outputs. For instance, 
Decker (2007:732) suggested that organizational tension may lead to inefficiency in 
producing intended outputs: 
The challenges that face all specialized units . . . include avoiding isolation, a lack 
of information sharing, an inability to penetrate community environments, the 
lack of links to other enforcement and prosecution agencies, and in some cases, 
the creation of conflict within the police organization and with the community.  
 
Similarly, in one of the classic textbooks on police administration, Wilson (1973) 
suggested a cautious establishment of specialized units. He argued that “specialized units 
should be created only when overall departmental capability has significantly increased 
and should not be created at the expense of reduced control and decreased general 
interest.” Police practitioners have also raised concerns about the diffusion of specialized 
units in police organizations. For instance, Staft (1980:7) maintained that increasing 
30 
 
specialization can lead to numerous intra-organizational drawbacks, including 
communication barriers and unnecessary competition: 
As each subunit is created, additional communication problems develop. Subunits 
are likely to become preoccupied with their own objectives instead of working 
toward the agency’s overall goals, they may fail to volunteer assistance and 
information to another subunit, or even worse, they may deliberately frustrate 
efforts of competing subunits.  
 
Research confirms the possibility that specialization may not necessarily lead to 
the intended outputs. In a study comparing the work types between “patrol generalists” 
and “community policing specialists,” Parks, Mastrofski, DeJong, and Gray (1999) 
posited that specialists’ encounters with citizens are fewer than generalists’ interactions. 
Based on observations of the two types of officers in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, 
Parks et al. argued that officers assigned to community policing spent more time with 
paperwork and research than interacting with residents. However, the study was not clear 
about whether community policing specialists were embedded in separate community 
policing units.  
Robinson and Chandek (2000) also examined whether community policing 
assignment (i.e., specialization) affected the level of interaction between victims of 
domestic violence and detectives and/or officers (i.e., outputs). Robinson and Chandek 
(2000) tested the hypothesis that victims of domestic violence are more likely to 
participate in formal criminal justice procedures (e.g., signing warrants) when the major 
role of interacting officers is related to community policing. The rationale behind this 
hypothesis is that victims may have more confidence in police practice when officers 
were equipped with community policing beliefs. However, their analysis did not find 
support for the hypothesis. Situational factors (e.g., presence of children, use of weapon, 
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injury of victim, history of domestic violence complaints by victims, arrest at the scene, 
etc.) affect the victims’ willingness to proceed with their cases formally, but whether or 
not officers were from community policing units was not a statistically significant factor 
in victims’ decisions to pursue their cases within the criminal justice system. Robinson 
and Chandek additionally investigated the possibility that officers with community 
policing obligations behave differently from other officers. The effect of specialized 
units—in this case, community policing units—was not considered in the research.  
 A few researchers have examined the association between specialized units and 
the extent to which the units were developed to achieve goals but not outputs. For 
instance, Rutherford, Blevins, and Lord (2008) examined the direct effect of a street 
crime unit on citizens’ fear of crime. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in 
North Carolina created a street crimes unit to address increasing robberies and other 
serious crimes in 2005. Rutherford et al. evaluated the effectiveness of the newly 
established specialized unit on citizens’ fear of crime after six months. They found no 
statistically significant relationship between the two, but citizens did report perceiving an 
increased police presence on the street. Rutherford et al. concluded that creation of the 
street crime unit was not effective.   
While examining the major issues involved in community policing 
implementation, Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2005) argued that one obstacle in 
implementing community policing is the presence of specialized community policing 
units. Based on a survey of 68 middle managers in 44 police departments across the 
United States, they revealed that separate units hinder communication among officers 
from different units and divisions. Thus, philosophy and specific programs in facilitating 
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community policing are not shared organization-wide but are limited to officers in an 
“innovation ghetto” (Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman, 2005:502). Key issues surrounding 
conflict and coordination among specialized units were presented. These authors did not 
provide any evidence whether specialized community policing units were effective and/or 
efficient in producing outputs. Rather, their research mostly offered the opinions and 
perceptions of mid-level supervisors in police departments.  
 
SUMMARY 
Police organizations are becoming increasingly specialized. But despite the 
significance of division of labor, not much research has investigated how police agencies 
divide their roles and how division of police labor has an effect on police outputs. Some 
studies explored how and why police organizations set up specialized units. However, the 
effect that such units have on police outputs has been largely ignored. Researchers have 
not investigated the association between the creation of specialized units and their 
achievement of intended goals. For instance, does creation of cyber-crime units increase 
arrests for cyber-crime? Do police organizations arrest more gang member after agencies 
set up new gang units? Does the creation of internal affairs units increase the detection of 
problematic officers? Do police departments implement more community policing 
programs if they operate separate community policing units? These questions remain 
unanswered in spite of increased empirical attention upon the topic of police 
specialization.  
Researchers interested in studying the structure of police departments have 
investigated specialization as only one of numerous components of police organizations 
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(Skogan and Frydl, 2004). That is, the specific effect of specialization has not been 
disentangled from bureaucracy or other concepts of organizational structure 
(Langworthy, 1986; Maguire 2003). When researchers have investigated specialized 
units, the focus often has been on the process by which such units were created. Thus, 
studies have ignored how the establishment of specialized units directly affects police 
department activities (i.e., organizational outputs). This argument is summarized in 
Figure 2.1. Prior research has focused on the links between organizational and 
environmental factors and the creation of police specialized units (A). However, the 
association between the establishment of such units and organizational outputs (B) has 
not been explored.  
 
Figure 2.2. The Proposed Causal Relationship between Police Units and Outputs 
 
 
In this dissertation, the creation of community policing units and their intended 
effect on agencies’ outputs is a focus of study. More specifically, I will examine whether 
police organizations’ outputs of community policing differ depending on the existence of 
specialized community policing units. The following chapter provides a brief 
introduction to community policing, including its core elements and the reason why 
community policing units have been selected in discussing the effect of specialization 
within police departments.   
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CHAPTER 3. COMMUNITY POLICING AND POLICE 
ORGANIZATION 
 
The issue of specialization has become more complex since police organizations 
began to embrace the community policing philosophy in the 1970s. Unlike advocates of 
traditional policing tactics, community policing proponents encourage police 
organizations to adopt different approaches in terms of structuring organizations, relating 
to their local communities, and tackling local problems. Specifically, the community 
policing approach has an important relevance in this research insofar as it calls for less 
specialization within police departments. I start with a brief introduction of the 
community policing approach. Next, I discuss key elements of community policing and 
specialization within the context of community policing. Finally, I posit research 
questions for this study.  
 
COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Now a major aspect of American policing, community policing developed from 
the changing relationship between police departments and society. Since the early 20
th
 
century, police reformers have attempted to prevent corruption and to control officers’ 
behavior on the street. This “professional model” highlighted reactive strategies that 
focus on quick response to calls for service and crime fighting on the street (Moore, 
1992). Historically, police departments were characterized by homogeneity of 
organizational structures and strategies. That is, although police agencies faced different 
problems in diverse contexts, most police departments relied on strategies that 
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emphasized the importance of catching criminals and, after widespread availability of the 
telephone in homes, responding to citizens’ calls as quickly as possible (Mastrofski and 
Willis, 2010).  
Such efforts, combined with technological developments (specifically, the 
introduction of motorized patrol), have contributed to the isolation of the police from the 
public (Greene, 2000). Community cooperation to prevent and solve crime was hard to 
obtain (Walker and Katz, 2010). Therefore, since the 1970s an increasing number of 
police departments have adopted the community policing philosophy in an attempt to be 
more accessible to and in better communication with community members. The 
establishment of a federal agency—i.e., the Community Oriented Policing Services—has 
also contributed to the widespread diffusion of this new approach (Mastrofski and Willis, 
2010).  
This new approach in policing has been hailed as an alternative to traditional 
policing tactics (Walker and Katz, 2010). In contrast to the traditional approach, the new 
community policing perspective starts from the premise that because communities have 
their own unique problems and situations, different strategies need to be developed and 
implemented accordingly (Moore, 1992). Specifically, community policing demands that 
police agencies take citizens’ concerns and needs into account in their daily policing 
activities. Thus, community policing considers community as a co-producer of police 
services as well as a recipient, not as a target of policing tactics (Moore, 1992; Skogan, 
2004).  
The federal government has poured unprecedented resources into implementing 
community policing in local police departments across the United States and community 
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policing has been regarded as “the most widely adopted police innovation” during the 
1990s (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 46). Greene (2000: 301) even argued that community 
policing “has become the national mantra of the American police.” The popularity and 
prevalence of community policing by police departments has continued to grow in recent 
years (Cordner, 2004; Eck and Maguire, 2000; Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).  
Community policing can be implemented in different ways in sheriffs’ 
departments and municipal police departments. As briefly mentioned above, local police 
departments in the United States are characterized by high levels of heterogeneity in 
terms of operations, personnel management, and priorities in daily policing. Significant 
differences exist between sheriffs’ departments and municipal police departments in 
leadership formation. For instance, the chiefs of sheriffs’ departments are traditionally 
elected by their residents, whereas the head of municipal police departments are typically 
appointed by elected officials. Also, the former are directly involved in all facets of the 
criminal justice system (i.e., police, court, and correction), while municipal tasks are 
generally limited to policing (Skogan and Frydl, 2004).  
Not surprisingly, the way community policing is implemented may not be the 
same in sheriffs’ departments relative to large municipal police departments. LaFrance 
and Placide (2010) argued that the chiefs in sheriffs’ and municipal police departments 
have different attitudes and relationships with board members in their local governments. 
While sheriffs demonstrated keen interest in working together with their counterparts in 
the local governing body, police chiefs in municipal police departments did not. 
Considering that sheriffs are elected by their residents and police chiefs are appointed by 
local politicians, this difference may not be surprising. Similarly, Falcone and Wells 
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(1995) maintained that sheriff’s department personnel are not exempt from the concern of 
their sheriff’s re-election. Thus, officers in sheriff’s departments may be more sensitive to 
citizens’ interests and satisfaction in community policing programs.  
Another key issue in community policing is that policing scholars do not agree 
upon what the new approach entails in theory and in practice, or even exactly how to 
classify it. Some regard it as “operational approaches” (e.g., Moore, 1992) or a “new 
style of policing” (Greene, 2000), while others consider it as “a variety of philosophical 
and practical approaches” (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).  
The lack of consensus regarding what is included in community policing has been 
problematic for practitioners as well. For instance, as will be discussed below, according 
to many advocates, one of the key elements in community policing is despecialization 
(Greene, 2000). That is, there is a strong trend in the community policing movement to 
argue that police agencies should attempt to make officers generalists so that all officers 
can engage in community policing activities (see Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). In some 
cases, however, creation of specialized units has been regarded as part of community 
policing efforts. For instance, Weisel and Shelley (2004) argued that specialized gang 
units in the Indianapolis Police and the San Diego Police Departments  
function as part of community policing and problem-solving approaches. That is, gang 
units in these two police agencies increased inter- and intra-agency partnership and 
collaboration with community members to combat gang problems. Also, analysis and 
provision of gang-related data was critical in tackling gang issues. In short, Weisel and 
Shelley maintained that gang units can be used as an organizational structure that 
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complements community policing efforts by providing resources to combat gang 
problems.  
Therefore, critically reviewing the components of community policing is 
important in understanding the effects of specialized units. Without close examination of 
community policing activities implemented by police agencies, suggesting that such 
activities affect numerous outcomes (e.g., reduction of crime, fear of crime, or calls for 
service) may be misleading (Wilson, 2004). Thus, it has to be kept in mind that 
community policing activities can include diverse programs even though police agencies 
promote them under the single banner of community policing. This confusion is one of 
the key reasons why it is essential to look into the components of community policing.  
 
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAMS 
A few researchers have attempted to uncover the elements of community policing. 
However, theoretical and empirical studies on the dimensionality reveal mixed results 
(see Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000). Still, investigation of key elements of community 
policing is essential for several reasons. First, investigators have tended to examine 
different policing tactics as if they are the same, simply because the tactics were 
implemented under the theme of “community policing” (Moore, 1994). For instance, 
some police departments may prioritize and promote the organizational aspects of 
community policing, while other agencies may encourage partnerships within the local 
communities. If the two distinct activities are branded as simply community policing 
activities, we lose a lot of information in investigating them as either independent or 
dependent variables. Thus, community policing can be criticized for being a “hodge-
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podge” of desirable programs (Crank and Langworthy, 1996) or a “potpourri” of 
numerous strategies (Maguire and King, 2004).  
Second, empirical studies have used different criteria in evaluating the 
effectiveness of community policing programs. For instance, Chappell, MacDonald, and 
Manz (2006) constructed community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing 
variables from numerous items. No clear explanation, however, was provided as to their 
conceptual basis (see also MacDonald, 2002). Such inconsistency and lack of standards 
hinder our understanding of how community policing programs are executed and what 
affects the successful implementation of these programs.  
Consequently, by separating community policing programs into distinct 
dimensions or elements, we can better understand the factors that affect their 
implementation. Therefore, this research relies on the categorization of community 
policing by Fridell (2004). She suggested three elements or “essential efforts” of 
community policing: (1) community engagement; (2) problem-solving; and (3) 
organizational transformation.  
Several other policing scholars have proposed similar elements of community 
policing with slightly different terms. For instance, Walker and Katz (2010) proposed 
three characteristics of community policing: (1) community engagement; (2) 
organizational change; and (3) problem-solving. Somewhat similarly, Mastrofski and 
Willis (2010) also provided three distinct elements: (1) community engagement in 
making policies and delivering services; (2) embracing problem-oriented policing 
approaches; and (3) organizational decentralization. Additionally, Maguire and Wells 
(2009) suggested three dimensions of community policing: (1) problem-solving; (2) 
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community engagement; and (3) organizational adaptation. I will adopt the three key 
elements proposed by Fridell (2004)—community engagement, problem-solving, and 
organizational transformation—and elaborate on them below.  
 
 (1) Community Engagement in Policing   
Community engagement refers to active participation by citizens and local groups 
in crime prevention and the development of police strategies. Traditionally, police 
departments were regarded as the sole provider of policing service. Police organizations 
had the full responsibility for implementing strategies to tackle local problems (e.g., 
crime, gangs, and disorder, etc.) and have taken the blame for the failure of keeping their 
communities safe. However, scholars as well as practitioners now realize that community 
safety cannot be maintained entirely by police departments (Bayley, 1994).  
In addition, police and the public tend to have different priorities in identifying 
the problems of their communities. Police traditionally have focused on tackling crime, 
but community members place more emphasis on reducing the fear of crime, keeping 
peace in public places, and following democratic procedures in enforcing the law (Moore, 
1992). Thus, community policing proponents argue that police departments need to 
develop strategies based on “the public’s definition of its own problems” (Skogan 
2004:160). To achieve this goal, cooperation and partnership with community members 
and groups has been strongly encouraged and citizen engagement in developing and 
implementing policies is central in community policing.  
Specifically, Fridell (2004) suggested the following factors as community 
engagement elements:  
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(1) increase of “interaction and familiarity” with community members  
(2) partnership formation with community groups  
 
First, police can increase interaction with community members in a number of 
ways. For instance, police agencies can provide foot and bike patrol and hold community 
meetings to communicate with their constituents. Also, police departments can operate a 
citizen police academy or other outreach programs, like Police Athletic Leagues and 
citizen volunteer programs. These special programs enable citizens to become more 
familiarized with police work as well as provide information on their communities to the 
police.  
Second, police departments strive to form close partnerships with local 
community groups (public or private). Partnerships with diverse community groups play 
an important role in the delivery of police service. In fact, a close partnership with 
community members is “the watchword” in community policing programs (Greene, 
2000). Many community problems and concerns raised by citizens (e.g., vacant houses 
and dirty streets filled with litter) cannot be solved solely by the police. To cooperate and 
partner with other public agencies is critical in addressing many issues, yet has been also 
one of the most challenging parts of community policing efforts (Skogan, 2004).  
 
(2) Introduction of the Problem-Solving Approach   
The problem-solving approach means that police departments focus on the root 
causes of crime problems, rather than simply responding to calls for services (Goldstein, 
1987). Thus, the problem-solving approach requires police officers to think more 
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proactively about the issues in their neighborhoods. Officers start to investigate what lies 
beneath residents’ repeated complaints and calls for service. More specifically, Fridell 
(2004) suggested that the problem-solving approach consists of the following two 
elements:  
(1) implementation of problem-solving tactics; and 
 (2) support for problem-solving through training, performance measurement, 
and other tools 
 
 First, one of the key elements in community policing is that officers need to take a 
creative approach in addressing local problems. Rather than repeatedly responding to 
similar incidents caused by the same underlying conditions, police need to gather data, 
develop strategies, implement them, and evaluate the tactics (Goldstein, 1987). 
Specifically, police take the SARA approach in solving local problems: Scanning, 
Analysis, Response, and Assessment (Walker and Katz, 2010). Scanning refers to the 
observation of local problems by the police. Police then try to figure out the problems and 
underlying causes in the Analysis step. Response means a implementation of a program to 
tackle the identified problems. Finally, police evaluate their program strategy in the 
Assessment stage. By taking this proactive approach, officers can develop creative 
strategies to deal with local problems.   
 Second, police departments have to support officers in developing a problem-
solving approach. Officers need to be trained in “recognizing patterns of incidents” 
(Skogan, 2004:161), and their performance needs to be evaluated. Police agencies must 
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invest more resources in training, performance measures, and evaluation to increase 
officers’ problem-solving capabilities.  
 
(3) Organizational Transformation   
Traditionally, police organizations have been reluctant to change. Specifically, 
studies have found that many field officers are unwilling to be involved in community 
policing activities (see Maguire and Gantley, 2009b). Community policing officers are 
sometimes called “empty holster guys” (Skogan, 2004) and are ridiculed by their peers 
for not doing “real police work.” These phrases show that changing the perspective of 
officers and organizational philosophy can be a daunting task. Put differently, the 
resistance of officers reveals how important it is for police departments to train officers 
and thereby change perspectives. Thus, organizational transformation is not just about 
structural change but also agency-wide support for community policing and the problem-
solving approach (Fridell, 2004) through:  
(1)  development of plans and training that include a community policing 
philosophy; 
(2)  reducing the levels of management within police departments; and 
(3) physical decentralization of patrol officers and detectives. 
 
First, plans or policies do effectively change the behavior of police, and previous 
studies also describe the role of official plans in implementing community policing 
(Skogan, 2006). In fact, many proponents of community policing maintain that the effort 
should be an agency-wide philosophy rather than newly developed strategies (e.g., 
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Maguire, 1997). Also, training for members involved in community policing is critical 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1998) not only because training can provide relevant 
skills and tactics necessary to implement the new strategy but also because training sends 
a signal to the trainees that police managers are serious about the new approach (Skogan 
and Hartnett, 1997).  
Second, police agencies need to change their organizational structure so that field 
officers are free of bureaucratic hurdles in implementing community policing programs. 
Community policing supporters claim that traditional organizational management can 
play a negative role by compromising constructive interactions between police and 
communities (Greene, 2000). Mid- and upper-level managers are comfortable with the 
status quo because their authority is already established  in the traditional organizational 
structure (Skogan, 2004). Thus, “pushing power downward in the agency” is another key 
element of community policing (Fridell, 2004:8). Police agencies need to devolve 
decision-making powers to line officers so that officers themselves can identify 
community problems and develop tactics to address such problems (Cordner, 2001; 
Fridell, 2004; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988).  
Last, physical decentralization of officers enables them to interact with 
community members more closely (Fridell, 2004:8). Police departments can create sub-
stations, mini-stations, precinct stations, or store fronts and put officers at such sites. By 
doing so, police can be more accessible to citizens and officers can be more familiar with 
the pressing issues and problems of the local area. In short, geographic decentralization 
of officers “change[s] the working environment, fostering creative thinking, innovation, 
and strong commitment to solving problems” (Maguire and Gantley, 2009b).  
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SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY POLICING UNITS 
As shown above, the three elements of community policing posit that the new 
approach needs to be embraced and implemented agency-wide. Thus, creation of 
specialized community policing units may be ironic in a community policing era. The 
philosophy of community policing calls for generalized (not specialized) police officers 
so that every officer can be involved in close interactions with citizens and problem-
solving activities. However, the creation of specialized units committed to community 
policing strategies may signify that officers in the units are mainly responsible for the 
implementation of diverse community policing programs (Moore, 1992).  
If specialized community policing units are loosely coupled with other aspects of 
organizational structure, such units are likely to experience difficulties in performing 
diverse community policing programs (Webb and Katz, 2003). Community policing 
programs demand collaboration among diverse functional units. Therefore, if community 
policing units are not linked or connected with other organizational configurations, the 
units can undergo huge challenges due to isolation, lack of interaction with other 
organizational members, or even indifference and hostility (Webb and Katz, 2003).  
Nevertheless, research has been relatively silent on why police leaders decide to 
establish separate community policing units. In fact, as shown above, a study by Maguire 
and Gantley (2009a) is one of only a few that has examined the role of community 
policing units. Investigating community policing activities revealed that 8 out of 12 
police departments had specialized community policing units (Maguire and Gantley, 
2009a). In addition, variability existed among police organizations regarding the way in 
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which community policing activities were structured by the individual agencies. Three 
models were identified: specialized, generalized, and hybrid models.  
In the specialized model, police departments perform community policing through 
separate units specifically devoted to program implementation. As revealed above, police 
administrators opt for specialized models because of availability of funding, officers’ lack 
of interest, and the symbolic value of specialized units. In contrast, in generalized 
models, police departments try to implement community policing in an agency-wide 
manner in which all officers engage in community policing activities. Most community 
policing supporters think of this model as ideal even though agencies using this approach 
are often faced with difficulties in adopting the generalized model due in part to the 
limited understanding of officers and lack of time and resources. Hybrid models are 
found where police organizations start to move from specialized to generalized models 
(Maguire and Gantley, 2009a).  
In short, the presence of separate community policing units reveals the conflict 
between the ideal and the reality of a new approach (Weisel and Shelley, 2004). Creation 
of specialized units to implement community policing is antithetical to the core principles 
that such units are supposed to keep. Even so, it has become an empirical question to 
investigate the roles and beneficial effects of specialized community policing units 
because of their widespread use within contemporary police agencies.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As shown above, research generally has ignored the possibility that differences in 
outputs may exist across agencies with different models, and few researchers have 
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investigated whether agencies maintain one specific model in implementing community 
policing programs. Given this context, the goals of this dissertation are twofold: (1) to 
investigate the conditions under which community policing units are created within 
police departments; and (2) to study the effect of community policing units on the 
implementation of community policing programs. Specifically, this research addresses 
two significant questions: 
 
1. Have police agencies increased (or decreased) community policing units over time?  
Specialized community policing units were examined to track whether police 
agencies change structure over time. That is, what is the scope of specialized police units 
in the United States? To assess specialization in American policing, the research 
measured the extent to which specialized community policing units have increased in 
American police organizations in recent years. By describing changes in separate 
community policing units, the patterns of specialization within police agencies can be 
identified.  
Structural change was used as a key independent variable in this research. 
Community policing scholars have maintained that police agencies need to despecialize 
their organizations. However, not much is known about whether despecialization has 
actually occurred in police departments. As an important component of community 
policing, the operation of specialized units will reveal whether police organizations have 
increased or decreased their division of labor.  
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2. How does creation of community policing units affect the outputs in community 
policing program?   
Studies measuring organizational success or effectiveness have used rate of crime, 
disorder, and other law enforcement activities as key dependent variables (e.g., Maguire 
and Uchida, 2000; Mastrofski and Willis, 2010), but not much research has examined 
community policing activities as a dependent variable. As shown above, community 
policing programs are oftentimes used as an explanatory variable to measure their effect 
on crime or fear of crime. The effect of organizational structures on police activity 
outcomes has not been extensively studied (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). That is, the 
causal mechanism between organizational structure changes and the resulting efficacy of 
police activities has been largely ignored.  
Therefore, this study examined the effect of structural change on the 
implementation of community policing activities. More specifically, the research tracked 
whether establishing new community policing units tends to improve the outcomes of 
community policing activities. Community policing programs were divided into three 
distinct elements, and these three elements were used as dependent variables.  
Although only a few studies have empirically tested such dimensionality, 
elements, or subcategories of community policing activities, different dimensions have 
been identified by researchers (e.g., Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000). How police 
departments choose—and, often, mix—their community policing strategies requires 
further investigation. Specifically, identifying the variation in community policing 
elements is important for two reasons. First, without investigating the differences in 
police departments’ community policing dimensions, making generalizations becomes 
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difficult (Cordner, 1995). For instance, two different agencies that claim that they are 
implementing community policing may actually have two radically different approaches 
(e.g., one may focus on geographic reallocation of officers while the other may focus on 
personnel training).  
Second, it is worthwhile to test whether organizational and environmental factors 
have a similar effect on different elements of community policing. Local police 
departments have obtained enormous external funding to implement community policing, 
but not many researchers have examined how such financial assistance has been put to 
use by police agencies (Wilson, 2004). For the funding agencies, it may be imperative to 
look at the specifics of community policing programs to check the proper management of 
resources and to ensure financial responsibility (Kennedy, 1993). Therefore, the current 
study grouped numerous community policing activities into three broader dimensions and 
treated those dimensions as outcome variables. Organizational and environmental factors 
were studied to explain the variations in such dimensions.  
Moreover, different types of police agencies do not necessarily operate in similar 
patterns, including implementation of community policing activities. Thus, this 
dissertation will investigate whether differences in community policing activities exist 
between sheriffs’ departments and municipal police departments. The model is presented 
in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. The Model of the Current Study 
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 This chapter provided a brief overview of community policing. Key elements or 
dimensions of community policing were addressed. The chapter concluded by proposing 
research questions centered on the causal linkage between the creation of community 
policing units on the implementation of community policing programs and their outputs. 
The next chapter describes the data, methods, and statistical techniques used to examine 
these questions.   
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
Many policing scholars have lamented the lack of longitudinal studies on police 
organizations (e.g., Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). Few studies have looked into the 
factors that may play a role in restructuring police organizations over time (Maguire, 
2002). To examine the change of outputs and factors affecting such change in police 
agencies, I used the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS), which will be described in detail below. Because I used multiple waves of the 
LEMAS, I will describe how I merged three waves into a single dataset. Also, I will 
specify how variables included in the analyses were constructed. Elements of community 
policing activities were selected as dependent variables, and I provide the rationale for 
variable construction. The presence or absence of a specialized community policing unit 
is a key independent variable, so I will show how the variable was constructed as well as 
other control variables.  
The merged dataset consists of time series cross-sectional or panel data. 
Therefore, a linear panel analysis model was used to test the effect of community 
policing units on police organizations’ community policing activities. Finally, this 
chapter concludes by presenting the method of analysis and the justification for the 
statistical model employed.  
 
DATA 
THE LEMAS 
Because this study is focused on police operational processes (i.e., creation of 
community policing units) and outputs, the unit of analysis is the individual police 
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agency. Dependent variables and the organizational aspect of independent variables were 
derived from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). 
The LEMAS is a sample survey of United States law enforcement agencies and was 
developed out of the recognition that there was not enough data to study police 
organizations compared to other elements of the American criminal justice system 
(Maguire and Uchida, 2000). Thus, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) developed the 
LEMAS and administered it for the first time in 1987. Since then, BJS has conducted the 
LEMAS survey every three or four years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007. The 
LEMAS includes questions about organizational structures, personnel, operations, 
budgets and pay, technology, and facilities (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).  
The LEMAS includes federal, state, and tribal agencies. However, the roles, 
operations, and organizational characteristics of federal and state police agencies are 
different from those of municipal and county sheriff’s departments (Cordner and 
Scarborough, 1999). For example, roles and responsibilities of federal agencies are 
determined by federal legislation and do not include “the ambiguous and difficult order 
maintenance” tasks and other peace-keeping activities for local residents (Walker and 
Katz, 2010). Also, the function of state police agencies differs from that of municipal and 
county sheriff’s departments. While the former is generally restricted to highway patrol 
and support for small police departments’ crime investigation, the latter focuses on 
interactions with residents and responding to calls for services (Walker and Katz, 2010).  
Specifically, the discussion of community policing has been focused on local 
police departments—either municipal police departments or county sheriff’s 
departments—with good reasons. Relative to federal and state police agencies, local 
53 
 
police departments have more room for developing and implementing community 
policing programs, which is due in part to the proximity to residents and local knowledge 
(Cordner and Scarborough, 1999).  
For this research, only municipal police departments and sheriff departments were 
selected. Thus, municipal police and sheriff’s department that participated in any one of 
the three waves of LEMAS from 2000 and 2007 were included in the dataset. Table 4.1 
shows the number of cases (i.e., municipal and sheriff’s departments) before and after 
data construction. The left side of the table shows the number of police agencies in each 
wave of the LEMAS. As will be shown below, agencies that participated in all three 
waves were selected for further analysis to identify changes and factors affecting these 
changes. Thus, the right side of the Table 4.1 shows the final cases included for the 
analysis. In total, 641 departments were included in the analyses.
2
  
 
Table 4.1. Samples in the LEMAS and in the Dataset of this Study 
LEMAS Organization Type Frequency (%)  Dataset Frequency (%) 
2000 Sheriff’s Dept. 881 (32.2)    
2000 Municipal Police Dept. 1857 (67.8)    
2003 Sheriff’s Dept. 359 (32.2)  Sheriff’s Dept. 198 (30.9) 
2003 Municipal Police Dept. 756 (67.8)  Municipal Police Dept. 443 (69.1) 
2007 Sheriff’s Dept. 348 (32.6)    
2007 Municipal Police Dept. 721 (67.4)    
 
 
                                                          
2
 Data for the two subgroups Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments were subjected to 
two separate analyses. I discuss the rationale behind this decision in Method of Analysis section.  
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PANEL DATA (TIME SERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA) 
Three waves of LEMAS data from 2000 to 2007 were merged. Specifically, the 
dataset compiled from the above process is time series cross-sectional (TSCS) or panel 
data. That is, local law enforcement agencies (i.e., municipal police and county sheriff’s 
departments) that participated in all three waves of the LEMAS were selected and 
longitudinal datasets were constructed by assembling three waves of cross-sectional 
datasets. Therefore, each police organization included in the dataset (n=1, 2, . . . , N) was 
observed at three periods (t=1, 2, and 3) with several variables (k=1, 2, . . . , K). The 
TSCS data structure is regarded as the standard format that can then permit more 
advanced analyses (Menard, 2002).  
One of the challenges in the utilization of the LEMAS for longitudinal research is 
the discrepancy of questions across waves of data. When the same content area was 
measured, the questions were sometimes asked differently. It may not be surprising to 
find such inconsistency, considering that the main purpose of the LEMAS survey is to 
provide a description of U.S. police agencies and not to investigate the organizational 
changes or causal relationships. In fact, it is not uncommon to face such challenges 
within longitudinal data, especially collected by government agencies (Menard, 2002).  
Despite such variations, many consistencies are maintained across different waves 
of data. For instance, the number of personnel—sworn officers or civilian personnel—is 
one of questions that the LEMAS consistently asks police agencies. Fortunately for the 
purpose of this study, the items included in the community policing section reveal 
considerable similarities. Thus, it is possible to follow changes in police organizational 
structure and activities when the same items are included in several waves of data. 
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Moreover, the LEMAS is a useful source of data to answer the research questions of this 
study because it includes information both on structure (community policing units) and 
outputs (community policing program implementation) of police departments.  
Furthermore, the factors that may have affected such changes can also be 
identified using two or more waves of data, as well as other sources of data. In other 
words, longitudinal analyses are possible once several datasets are matched. However, 
due to these differences across the LEMAS, using the LEMAS surveys for longitudinal 
analyses of certain topics must be done cautiously (Menard, 2002).  
Due to question overlap in the LEMAS, a few prior studies have set the precedent 
of merging several LEMAS datasets to examine causal mechanisms between 
organizational factors and outcomes of police agencies. For instance, Wells and Falcone 
(2005) merged the LEMAS 1997 and 1999 along with the Uniform Crime Report and 
other socioeconomic datasets. Also, Roberts and Roberts (2006) used three waves of the 
LEMAS data to investigate the association between network ties and their effect on 
innovation by police agencies. This present study also merged three waves of the 
LEMAS, including the most recent waves of data (i.e., LEMAS 2007). The compiled 
dataset for the analysis went through several steps; the complete process is shown in 
Appendix 1.  
It is worth noting that the way dependent variables were constructed in this study 
is not the same for 2000-2003 and 2003-2007 data analyses. As mentioned earlier, items 
included in community policing sections changed slightly from wave to wave. Therefore, 
I decided to construct two different sets of dependent variables to keep as much 
information as possible. In short, I conducted two separate analyses (i.e., Analysis I and 
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Analysis II). The structure of the merged dataset—pooling or stacking multi-wave data—
is shown in Table 4.2. This structure is the most common framework for panel analysis 
(Finkel, 2008; Menard, 2002). 
 
Table 4.2. Structure of the Dataset 
   Variable 1: 
X1 
Variable 2: 
X2 
. . .  Variable K: 
XK 
Dependent 
Variable Y1 
Analysis I TIME 1 PD 1 X111 X112  X11K Y11 
(2000) PD 2 X211 X212  X21K Y21 
 …      
 PD N XN11 XN12  XN1K YN1 
TIME 2 PD 1 X121 X122  X12K Y12 
(2003) PD 2 X221 X222  X22K Y22 
 …      
 PD N XN21 XN22  XN2K YN2 
Analysis II TIME 1 PD 1 X121 X122  X12K Y12 
(2003) PD 2 X221 X222  X22K Y22 
 …      
 PD N XN21 XN22  XN2K YN2 
TIME 2 PD 1 X131 X132  X13K Y13 
(2007) PD 2 X231 X232  X23K Y23 
 …      
 PD N XN31 XN32  XN3K YN3 
Note: Adapted from Menard (2002). Longitudinal Research, 2
nd
 ed.  
 
Constructing TSCS data from multiple waves of the LEMAS is beneficial to 
understand the changes and the cause of changes in police operations, specifically 
considering the cost involved in conducting longitudinal research. As Menard (2002:80) 
argued, longitudinal analysis is “ultimately indispensable” in investigating changes across 
time and the factors attributable to such changes. In fact, prior research has taken a 
similar approach to examine the change of police outputs and their association with 
organizational factors. For instance, He, Zhao, and Lovrich (2005) used three waves of 
longitudinal data gathered by the Division of Governmental Studies and Services at 
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Washington State University from 1993 to 2000. He et al. compiled the datasets to 
produce panel data. The approach taken by this research is somewhat similar to that of He 
et al. (2005). However, the samples in the study by He et al. (2005) were limited to 
medium to large municipal police agencies, resulting in less than 200 departments. Also, 
specialization of police agencies was not considered as a factor related to community 
policing programs. Dependent variables also differ between that study and the present 
study.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Dimensions of Community Policing   
The dependent variables are three dimensions or elements of community policing 
activities, or program implementation (i.e., outputs of community policing). As discussed 
in Chapter 3, Fridell (2004) asserted that community policing includes three key 
elements: community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation. 
Each wave of the LEMAS used in this study has a separate community policing section 
that includes questions about activities implemented by police departments (i.e., policy, 
training of personnel, problem-solving activities, partnership formation, and conducting 
surveys). Most questions in this section reflect one of the dimensions of community 
policing.  
 Hence, I took the items of the LEMAS in the community policing section that 
reflected each element of community policing and grouped them into three dimensions 
based on the typology by Fridell (2004). If the items were categorical, they were recoded 
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into binary variables for consistency of data. The following three items were recoded 
through this dichotomization.  
First, in the LEMAS 2000, one question asked, “As of June 30, 2000, did your 
agency have a community policing plan?” Three different categories—i.e., (1) “Yes, 
formally written,” (2) “Yes, not formally written,” and (3) “No”—were presented in the 
survey. The same question, however, was asked in a slightly different manner in 2003 
and 2007. For instance, in the LEMAS 2003, the survey asked whether the agency 
“maintained or created a formal, written community policing plan,” and the survey 
participants were able to mark either “Yes” or “No.” Thus, I recoded the (1) “Yes, 
formally written” group into “Yes.” Two other groups (i.e., (2) “Yes, not formally 
written,” and (3) “No”) were recoded into “No.” Some information may be lost due to 
this decision, but the recoding is justifiable considering that I kept the consistency of 
contents across three waves of data.  
Second, in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007, items on community policing training 
for newly-recruited officers asked, “ During the 12-month period ending June 30, what 
proportion of agency personnel received at least eight hours of community policing 
training (problem-solving, SARA, community partnerships, etc.)?” Four different 
categories—“all,” “half or more,” “less than half,” and “none”—were presented for the 
agencies to mark. I recoded this item into a dichotomous variable: training all officers or 
not. If agencies trained all officers, they were recoded as “Yes,” and if not, “No.”  
As noted above, personnel training on community policing is a key factor in 
changing organization members’ attitudes toward community policing. Training sends a 
strong message to officers and civilian personnel that their departments are serious about 
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implementing community policing programs. Thus, agencies that train all officers may be 
different from those that provide training to only a portion of officers. In addition, the 
composite score can reduce skewness by dichotomizing the item (Osgood, McMorris, 
and Potenza, 2002). Prior research also used the same coding scheme (e.g., Chappell et 
al., 2006). Last, the same question on training was asked for in-service personnel and I 
recoded it into a dichotomous variable for the same reason as mentioned earlier.  
After assigning items in each dimension based on the criteria of Fridell (2004), an 
additive scale of each dimension was calculated by summating dichotomized indicators 
in the questions to serve as dependent variables. Calculating a composite score from 
multiple-item data is not uncommon in social science research (Osgood et al., 2002). In 
fact, in addition to producing a dependent variable suitable for diverse statistical methods, 
researchers can make the most of information by summating items. Also, summative 
scaling can reduce the influence of an idiosyncratic score that may only be relevant to a 
certain item, thus improving the reliability of measures (Osgood et al., 2002).  
All items included in each dimension were binary items. Therefore, factor 
analysis was not appropriate in identifying dimensions of community policing because 
factor analysis assumes metrical values of binary data (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, 
and Galbraith, 2008).  
As discussed earlier, inconsistencies of survey questions exist across the three 
datasets. For instance, items on lists of groups that police agencies met with regularly are 
not the same (e.g., “domestic violence groups” was included only in 2000). In addition, 
as for the items on police agencies’ conducting surveys, the LEMAS 2007 used 
“conducted or sponsored a survey of citizens on crime, fear of crime, or satisfaction with 
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police services.” However, in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003, the same content was split into 
three separate items so that police agencies could choose one of three components. More 
details are discussed in each section of community policing elements. Therefore, 
decisions were made regarding item selection. How the three elements of community 
policing were constructed from the items in the LEMAS is described below.  
 
(1) Community Engagement   
As Fridell (2004) noted, community engagement elements of community policing 
activities involve close interaction with community members and groups. Thus, three 
items in the LEMAS were included in the community engagement element of community 
policing: (1) Having a citizen police academy program; (2) Training citizens in 
community policing; and (3) Partnering with local groups to solve crime problems. The 
exact items included in this element are shown in Table 4.3. 
As mentioned above, some discrepancies of questions regarding community 
engagement exist among the three waves of the LEMAS. First, the citizen police 
academy item is included in all three waves of the LEMAS from 2000 to 2007. However, 
citizen training in community policing was not included as an option in the LEMAS 
2007. Also, a question on partnership formation in the LEMAS 2000 asks “. . . which of 
the following groups did your agency meet with regularly (at least once every 3 months) 
to address crime-related problems?” Following this, ten different types of community 
groups were listed. In the LEMAS 2003 and 2007, the question was slightly changed into 
“. . . did your agency have a problem-solving partnership or written agreement with any 
of the following?” Following this, nine and eight community groups were provided 
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respectively. Table 4.3 presents the description of community engagement elements of 
questions included in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007.  
 
Table 4.3. Description of Community Engagement Element in the LEMAS (2000-
2007) 
2000 2003 2007 
Conducting a citizen police 
academy: Dummy 
Conducting a citizen police 
academy: Dummy 
Conducting a citizen police 
academy: Dummy 
Training citizens in community 
policing (e.g., community 
mobilization, problem-solving): 
Dummy 
Training citizens in community 
policing (e.g., community 
mobilization, problem-solving): 
Dummy 
None 
During the 12-month period 
ending June 30, 2000, which of 
the following groups did your 
agency meet with regularly (at 
least once every 3 months) to 
address crime-related problems? 
Mark all that apply. 
During the 12-month period 
ending June 30, 2003, did your 
agency have a problem-solving 
partnership or written agreement 
with any of the following? Mark 
all that apply. 
During the 12-month period 
ending September 30, 2007, did 
your agency have a problem-
solving partnership or written 
agreement with any of the 
following?  
 Advocacy groups 
 Business groups 
 Domestic violence 
groups 
 Local public agencies 
 Neighborhood 
associations 
 Religious groups 
 School groups 
 Senior citizen groups 
 Tenants’ associations 
 Youth service 
organizations 
 Did not meet with any 
groups 
 Advocacy groups 
 Business groups 
 Faith-based 
organizations 
 Local government 
agencies (non-law 
enforcement agencies) 
 Other local law 
enforcement agencies 
 Neighborhood 
associations 
 Senior citizen groups 
 School groups 
 Youth service 
organizations 
 None of the above 
 Advocacy groups 
 Business groups 
 Faith-based 
organizations 
 Other local law 
enforcement agencies 
 Neighborhood 
associations 
 Senior citizen groups 
 School groups 
 Youth service 
organizations 
 
To keep as much information as possible from the LEMAS dataset, I constructed 
two dependent variables from 2000 and 2003 and two separate dependent variables from 
2003 and 2007. That is, I constructed two sets of dependent variables for two separate 
analyses. For the analysis of 2000 and 2003 data, 10 overlapping items were included: (1) 
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citizen academy; (2) training citizens; (3) advocacy group; (4) business groups; (5) school 
groups; (6) senior citizen groups; (7) local public (government) agencies; (8) youth 
service; (9) neighborhood associations; and (10) religious groups (faith-based 
organizations).  
For the analysis of 2003 and 2007, nine overlapping items were included: (1) 
citizen academy; (2) advocacy group; (3) business groups; (4) school groups; (5) senior 
citizen groups; (6) local government agencies; (7) youth service; (8) neighborhood 
associations; and (9) faith-based organizations.  
 
 (2) Problem-Solving Approach   
The problem-solving approach requires police agencies to apply different 
methods in tackling local problems. That is, police departments actively propose and 
develop the problem-solving approach within their organizations. Also, police agencies 
communicate directly with community members to find out the problems and concerns 
from residents’ perspective (Fridell, 2004).  
The LEMAS 2000 through 2007 included four items on the problem-solving 
element of community policing suggested by Fridell (2004): (1) encouraging officers to 
engage in problem-solving projects; (2) forming problem-solving partnerships with 
community groups; (3) including problem-solving projects in evaluating officers; and (4) 
surveying citizens. Items included in this dimension are shown in Table 4.4. 
 As in the case with community engagement variables, however, slight differences 
were identified. For instance, in the LEMAS 2000, a response option on problem-solving 
partnership asked “Formed problem-solving partnerships with community groups, public 
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agencies, or others through specialized contracts or written agreements.” In the LEMAS 
2003 and 2007, the response option changed into “Partnered with citizen groups and 
included their feedback in the development of neighborhood or community policing 
strategies.” This research treated the two questions as the same.  
 
Table. 4.4. Description of Problem-Solving Element in the LEMAS (2000-2007) 
2000 2003 2007 
Actively encouraged patrol officers 
to engage in SARA-type problem-
solving projects on their beats: 
Yes/No 
Actively encouraged patrol officers 
to engage in SARA-type problem-
solving projects on their beats: 
Yes/No 
Actively encouraged patrol 
officers to engage in SARA-
type problem-solving 
projects on their beats: 
Yes/No 
Formed problem-solving 
partnerships with community 
groups, public agencies, or others 
through specialized contracts or 
written agreements. 
Partnered with citizen groups and 
included their feedback in the 
development of neighborhood or 
community policing strategies 
Partnered with citizen 
groups and included their 
feedback in the development 
of neighborhood or 
community policing 
strategies 
Included collaborative problem-
solving projects in the evaluation 
criteria of patrol officers 
Included collaborative problem-
solving projects in the evaluation 
criteria of patrol officers 
Included collaborative 
problem-solving projects in 
the evaluation criteria of 
patrol officers 
During the 12-month period ending 
June 30, 2000, did your agency 
conduct or sponsor a survey of 
citizens on any of the following 
topics? Mark all that apply. 
During the 12-month period ending 
June 30, 2003, did your agency 
conduct or sponsor a survey of 
citizens on any of the following 
topics? Mark all that apply. 
Conducted or sponsored a 
survey of citizens on crime, 
fear of crime, or satisfaction 
with police services: Yes/No 
 Public satisfaction with 
police services 
 Public perceptions of 
crime/disorder problems 
 Personal crime experiences 
of citizens 
 Reporting of crimes to law 
enforcement by citizens 
 Other – Specify 
 Public satisfaction with 
police services 
 Public perception of 
crime/disorder problems 
 Personal crime experiences 
of citizens 
 Reporting of crimes to law 
enforcement by citizens 
 Other (please specify) 
 
 
Also, in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003, a survey question asked “did your agency 
conduct or sponsor a survey of citizens on any of the following topics?” The response 
options provided four different types of surveys. In the LEMAS 2007, however, the 
question changed into a dichotomous item that included three types of surveys: 
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“Conducted or sponsored a survey of citizens on crime, fear of crime, or satisfaction with 
police services.” Table 4.4 presents the description of problem-solving approach elements 
of questions included in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007.  
Thus, for the analysis of 2000 and 2003, nine items were included to construct 
dependent variables: (1) encouragement of a problem-solving project; (2) formation of a 
problem-solving partnership; (3) evaluation of officers’ problem-solving; (4) survey on 
satisfaction with police; (5) survey on perception of crime; (6) survey on experience of 
crime; and (7) survey on reporting crime. For the analysis of 2003 and 2007 data, 
however, the item on three types of surveys in the LEMAS 2003 (satisfaction with police, 
perception of crime, and experience of crime) was recoded into a dichotomous variable to 
match the variable in the LEMAS 2007. 
 
(3) Organizational Transformation   
The organizational transformation element of community policing included seven 
items: (1) establishment of a formal community policing plan; (2) new officers’ 
community policing training; (3) community policing training on in-service sworn 
personnel; (4) community policing training on civilian personnel; (5) geographic 
placement of detectives; (6) geographic accountability for patrol officers; and (7) 
technological upgrade for community. Table 4.5 presents the description of 
organizational transformation elements of questions that were included in the LEMAS 
2000 through 2007.  
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Table. 4.5. Description of Organizational Transformation Element in the LEMAS 
(2000-2007)  
2000 2003 2007 
As of June 30, 2000, did your 
agency have a community policing 
plan? Mark only one.: Yes, 
formally written/Yes, not formally 
written/No 
Maintained or created a formal, 
written community policing plan: 
Yes/No 
Maintained an agency mission 
statement that included a 
community policing 
component: Yes/No 
During the 12-month period ending 
June 30, 2000, 
what proportion of agency 
personnel received at least 
eight hours of community policing 
training (problem-solving, SARA, 
community partnerships, etc.)? 
New officer recruits: All/Half or 
more/Less than half/None 
In-service sworn personnel: 
All/Half or more/Less than 
half/None  
Civilian personnel: All/Half or 
more/Less than half/None 
During the 12-month period 
ending June 30, 2003, what 
proportion of agency personnel 
received at least eight hours of 
community policing training 
(problem-solving, SARA, 
community partnerships, etc.)? 
New officer recruits: All/Half or 
more/Less than half/None 
In-service sworn personnel: 
All/Half or more/Less than 
half/None  
Civilian personnel: All/Half or 
more/Less than half/None 
During the 12-month period 
ending September 30, 2007, 
what proportion of agency 
personnel received at least 
eight hours of community 
policing training (problem- 
solving, SARA, community 
partnerships, etc.)? 
New officer recruits: All/Half 
or more/Less than half/None 
In-service sworn personnel: 
All/Half or more/Less than 
half/None  
Assigned detectives to cases based 
on geographic areas/beats 
None None 
Gave patrol officers responsibility 
for specific geographic areas/beats 
Gave patrol officers responsibility 
for specific geographic areas/beats 
Gave patrol officers 
responsibility for specific 
geographic areas/beats 
Upgraded technology to support 
community policing activities 
None Upgraded technology to 
support the analysis of 
community problems 
 
Some issues with the dependent variables need to be presented in advance. For 
instance, differentiating agencies with actively ongoing community policing programs for 
several years and those that showed short-term interests in community policing is not 
possible. The issue of “dosage” or “quality” in community policing research has been 
raised by prior studies (e.g., Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000) and this dissertation may not 
overcome such issues. However, level of engagement in the community policing 
activities can be addressed.  
66 
 
Pooling the LEMAS items may also present some concerns, especially regarding 
content validity. It is critical for instruments to have strong content validity. In fact, 
Haynes, Richard, and Kubany (1995:240) assert that “Data from an invalid instrument 
can overrepresent, omit, or underrepresent some facets of the construct and reflect 
variables outside the construct domain.” In other words, items included in each 
dimension have to be “the most relevant and representative” for assessing each of the 
community policing elements (Haynes et al., 1995:245).  
As will be discussed later, the items included in each dimension of community 
policing may not represent every aspect of community policing. Stated another way, the 
dependent variables in this study are not necessarily exhaustive measures of community 
policing activities by all local police departments. Nevertheless, these dependent 
variables do reveal most of the community policing activities (or outputs) suggested by 
Fridell (2004). Thus, while caution will be taken in drawing a firm conclusion from the 
results and generalizing to all police departments, I used as much information as possible 
from the LEMAS, one of the best data sources available that can identify organizational 
factors and diverse activities of police departments in the United States (Hickman and 
Piquero, 2009).  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Community Policing Units (CP Units) 
The independent variable was dichotomous and defined by whether a police 
department had a separate community policing unit (Yes=1, No=0). This study, like the 
LEMAS surveys themselves, relies on police departments self-identifying whether or not 
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they have specialized units that carry out community policing functions.
 3
 Establishment 
of community policing units, however, may not reflect the overall specialization in police 
organizations. For instance, police organizations can establish CP Units while eliminating 
other specialized units. In this case, there will be no change in the division of labor.  
In fact, measuring specialization is not simple and the complexity of quantifying 
the degree of specialization present in an organization is not unique to police 
departments. For instance, when measuring functional differentiation, investigators tend 
to count the number of departments or supervisors based on organizational charts. This 
method can be problematic because some specialized units or specialized personnel may 
not be reflected in official organizational charts (Dewar and Hage, 1978). Another issue 
related to the independent variable is that even when police agencies have separate 
community policing units, they may not operate these units in the same manner. In fact, 
research has found that police organizations apply different functional techniques in 
specialization unit operation (Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). Moreover, the LEMAS did 
not provide the precise definition of community policing units and it is not clear whether 
community policing units have separate supervisors and personnel devoted only to 
community policing activities within police departments.  
Nevertheless, the creation and operation of CP Units is evidence of organizations’ 
strategies to divide policing tasks. First, considering that officers tend to complain about 
the lack of time and resources to be involved in community policing, community policing 
activities are expected to be implemented by specialized units (Maguire and Gantley, 
2009a). Moreover, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) maintained, organizations do not 
                                                          
3
 Prior studies consistently showed that some police agencies “over-respond” in some questions when 
filling out the LEMAS (e.g., Maguire and Katz, 2002). By using other indicator items in the survey, I 
corrected 20 cases. See Appendix 2 for details. 
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respond to environmental demands or pressures in a stereotyped or uniform manner. 
Rather, different subunits respond to their “subenvironment” in their own ways 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), so specialized units tend to focus on their own territory 
and perform their major tasks. Thus, it may not be wrong to assume that specialized units 
play a predominant role in carrying out community policing programs and that 
investigating the role of specialized community policing units could reveal one aspect of 
organizational specialization.  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Police Strength 
Police strength was utilized as one of the control variables. Police service is 
heavily dependent upon personnel within the organization and prior research has 
examined intraorganizational and external factors that may explain variations of 
personnel strength among police agencies (see Koper, Maguire and Moore, 2001; Stucky, 
2005 for an overview of the studies).  
Police strength can influence police outcomes. For instance, police strength can 
mediate the association between the level of racial dispersion and property crimes (Akins, 
2003). Therefore, it may not be surprising that implementation of community policing 
programs require more personnel resources because community engagement and the 
problem-solving approach ask officers to engage more with their local residents and 
problem-solving activities (He et al., 2005). In this research, the number of officers was 
taken as a measure of police strength. Specifically, police strength was quantified as the 
number of officers per 100,000 residents rather than the absolute number of full-time 
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sworn officers. Thus, police strength was measured by dividing the number of full-time 
sworn police officers by total population served by the police department multiplied by 
100,000.  
 
Occupational Differentiation 
Occupational differentiation refers to the percentage of civilians within police 
agencies and is used interchangeably with civilianization rate in this paper (Langworthy, 
1985; Maguire, 2003). Skolnick and Bayley (1986) argued that civilianization of police 
can improve community policing efforts by freeing sworn officers from involvement in 
numerous administrative tasks and bringing in communities’ needs and wants to police 
agencies. Therefore, civilianization of personnel was introduced as a control variable. It 
was measured by dividing the number of full-time civilians by the total number of 
personnel (full-time civilians and sworn police officers).  
 
Operating Budget 
The budget of a police agency is another factor that plays an important role in 
implementing community policing (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Police departments with 
sufficient resources to implement community policing have at their disposal more 
personnel and facilities. These resources, in turn, can facilitate the agencies’ decisions to 
carry out diverse community policing activities. Resources here are measured by dividing 
total operating budget by the number of full-time sworn police officers. 
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Crime Rate 
Numerous studies have consistently found that characteristics of communities 
affect the willingness of residents to cooperate with police in enhancing the quality of 
living through crime prevention and problem-solving policing (e.g., Greene, 2000). Also, 
police behavior varies across communities (Klinger, 1997) and crime prevention 
programs are less effective in criminally active communities (Bursik and Grasmick, 
1993). Similarly, crime-stricken areas are less likely to be involved in crime prevention 
activities implemented by the police (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Davis, 1998). Thus, crime 
rate was also included as one of the control variables. 
Data for crime rate were from the Uniform Crime Report Crime 2000, 2003, and 
2007. Crime rate was measured by using the following computation: index crime 
(criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, 
and motor vehicle theft) / population * 100,000. Descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.  
 
METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Linear panel analysis was chosen to examine the change of three elements of 
community policing activities across time. This analytic approach was appropriate 
because data were collected multiple times and I was interested in finding why program 
implementation (i.e., outputs) of community policing in some police agencies changed 
more than in other departments (Finkel, 2008).  
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Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for Analysis I and II 
 
Analysis I (LEMAS 2000 & 2003) 
 
LEMAS 2000 LEMAS 2003 
 
Min Max. Mean S.D. N Min. Max. Mean S.D. n 
Community 
Engagement 
0 10 6.29 2.79 638 0 10 5.31 3.20 632 
Problem-Solving 0 7 2.76 2.12 638 0 7 2.94 2.16 634 
Organizational 
Transformation 
0 5 2.51 1.21 632 0 5 2.24 1.13 590 
  
 
 
Analysis II (LEMAS 2003 & 2007) 
 
LEMAS 2003 LEMAS 2007 
 
Min. Max. Mean S.D. n Min. Max. Mean S.D. n 
Community 
Engagement 
0 9 5.75 2.58 636 0 9 5.99 2.80 628 
Problem-Solving 0 4 1.92 1.28 636 0 4 2.09 1.31 631 
Organizational 
Transformation 
0 4 2.20 1.07 603 0 4 2.17 1.07 596 
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Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variable and Control Variables  
 LEMAS 2000 LEMAS 2003 LEMAS 2007 
 Min. Max. Mean S.D. n Min. Max. Mean S.D. n Min. Max. Mean S.D. n 
CP Units 0 1 0.65 0.48 626 0 1 0.58 0.49 626 0 1 .057 0.50 636 
Police Strength 1.33 73.38 18.11 1.00 641 1.36 71.28 17.82 9.78 641 1.22 66.51 18.00 9.80 641 
Occupational 
Differentiation 
0.00 75.30 25.04 12.50 641 0.08 40.00 10.12 5.37 640 0.00 85.37 29.37 16.12 641 
Operating Budget 
(logged) 
9.80 13.03 11.43 0.41 641 8.68 13.10 11.56 0.48 641 7.92 13.30 11.79 0.53 641 
Crime Rate 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.04 641 0.00 0.30 0.05 0.04 641 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.04 641 
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The dependent variables were continuous outputs calculated from summating 
numerous community policing indicators, and the data structure was TSCS (Menard, 
2002). In short, linear panel analysis is suitable for analyzing “continuous outcomes for 
multiple units at multiple points” (Finkel, 2008:475, emphasis original). As mentioned 
above, two separate analyses were based on two-period panel data. 
 
FIXED EFFECTS VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS 
Linear panel data can be analyzed by two distinct methods: fixed effects and 
random effects model (Allison, 1994; Finkel, 2008; Menard, 2002). Both models start 
from the simple principle of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and can be expressed as 
follows:  
 
                     (Equation 1) 
 
Where    (i=1….n) is the intercept for each police organization and     is the 
dependent variables where i = police department and t = time.     is one independent 
variable and    is the coefficient for that predictor variable. Finally,     is the error term 
for case i at time t. One of the key assumptions of OLS is that the error terms are not 
correlated.  
In a fixed effects model, it is assumed that case i at time t is not correlated with 
case i at time t+1 or t+2 in Equation 1 (Finkel, 2008). Accordingly, analysts came up 
with the idea of the unobservable factor that is unique to case i, or Ui. The unobservables 
are also assumed to be related to Y. For instance, in this research, the U term may include 
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culture of police organizations, willingness to implement community policing, or degree 
of officers’ racial composition. Equation 1 can consequently be rewritten as follows: 
 
                                             (Equation 2) 
 
In contrast, a random effects model assumes that the error component, Ui, is not 
correlated with a dependent variable (Yit) and other explanatory variables (Xji) across all 
time periods in the equation. This is the key difference between fixed and random effects 
models (Wooldridge, 2012). Thus, if Ui is not independent of any explanatory variables, 
then a random effects model will produce biased results. In other words, a fixed effects 
model should be used when there is a reason to believe that Ui may be correlated with an 
outcome variable or any independent variable (Finkel, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012).  
It should be noted, however, that the random effects approach can be used if 
theoretical justification exists that error terms are unrelated to explanatory variables in the 
model. In fact, one of reasons for using panel data is to allow for the correlation(s) 
between Ui and Xji variables (Finkel, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012). One advantage of using a 
random effects model is that such an approach can estimate the effect of time-invariant 
variables. For instance, random effects model can show the effect of type of agencies 
(i.e., sheriff’s departments vs. municipal police departments) on the outcome variable. In 
a fixed effects model, the time-constant factors are dropped out of the model 
automatically.  
However, as mentioned above, it may be difficult to argue that one of the error 
terms in Equation 2 (i.e., Ui) is uncorrelated with other independent variables or outcome 
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variables. That is, the unobserved department-specific effect can be related to other 
control variables (e.g., crime, size, budget, etc.) in the model used in this study. 
Therefore, I decided to use the fixed effects model and subdivided the sample into two—
sheriff’s departments and municipal police departments—rather than using type of 
agencies as one of the control variables.  
 
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
Equation 2 shows that each unit has its own intercept,     , where    is the 
average intercept for the dependent variable and     is the unobservable factor that is 
stable in case i. Thus,    makes each intercept move up or down. To solve this problem, 
dummy variables for n-1 units can be included to control for individual specific effects 
(Finkel, 2008). This is why the fixed-effects model is also called the least squares dummy 
variable model. When n is large, however, it is impractical to include all dummy 
variables. Therefore, more a common way to do the analysis is to calculate unit level 
means of all observable variables, as is written in Equation 3:  
 ̅         ̅        ̅          ̅      ̅      ̅    (Equation 3) 
 
Then Equation 4 can be written by subtracting Equation 3 from Equation 2.  
 
     ̅     (      ̅  )      (      ̅  )        (      ̅  )  (      ̅)   
          (Equation 4) 
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In Equation 4,    ̅  because Ui is constant over time, so the (    ̅ ) part is 
removed. Another approach is the so-called first difference model (Equation 5). This 
model also eliminates the unobservable and unit-specific effect—  —by subtracting 
Equation 2 from one-time period lag equation: 
 
              (         )      (           )        (           )  (         )   
          (Equation 5) 
 
Again,          , so stable unit effects are controlled in Equation 5. In fact, despite the 
parsimony of the model, Equation 5 is a great method to take into account unobservable 
differences among subjects (Finkel, 2008). Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that 
differences of community policing activities may be not only from explanatory variables 
but also from other factors that are not included in the model but are constant within a 
unit. Thus, Equation 5 can provide an insight into the effect of change in X on the change 
of Y. Equation 4 and Equation 5 produce a consistent result when T=2 (Finkel, 2008), so 
this study will investigate the effect of specialization on outputs of community policing 
programs using both equations.   
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
 
This chapter examines how specialized units have operationally changed in the 
first decade of the 21
st
 century. More importantly, I will examine whether the creation of 
specialized community policing units (CP Units) play a role in producing community 
policing outputs. Thirteen types of subunits were selected to identify patterns of the 
change in specialized units. I explored whether police agencies have increased or 
decreased the operation of specialized community policing units across time. As a first 
step to investigate the relationship between community policing units and community 
policing activities, independent sample t-tests were performed. Then linear panel analysis 
was used to draw causal inferences between community policing units and their program 
implementation.  
 
CREATION OF SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS 
INCREASE OF OPERATION 
As discussed before, the longitudinal dataset in this research makes it possible to 
trace the prevalence of specialized units among police departments in the United States. 
Figure 5.1 shows the patterns of numerous police subunits from 2000 to 2007. The bar 
graph includes thirteen different types of specialized units included in the LEMAS 
between 2000 and 2007. Because these units were included in all three waves of data 
collection, changes of unit operation could be identified.  
As Figure 5.1 shows, the results show interesting patterns. First, the portion of 
agencies in the sample that had bias crime units continuously increased from 6.7% in 
2000 to 8.1% in 2003 and to 8.3% in 2007. The growth of bias crime units can be 
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understood within the growth in public awareness of bias crime—sometimes referred to 
as hate crime—in recent years. Sandholtz, Langton, and Planty (2013) found that, 
although racially motivated crime has decreased, crime motivated by religious reasons 
has increased since the early 21
st
 century. Bias crime, even if committed to a single 
person, can be regarded as a threat to whole groups (religious, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, etc.). Thus, although the vast majority of police agencies do not have bias crime 
units, increasing number of police departments seem to feel more pressure from such 
groups to tackle and prevent such crimes (Bell, 2002).  
Figure 5.1. Operation of Specialized Police Units (n=641) 
 
The portion of agencies that contained domestic violence units increased from 
45.1% in 2000 to 54.1% in 2007. Like the general crime trend since the 1990s, domestic 
violence, more frequently called intimate partner violence, also declined continuously 
during the same period (Catalano, 2012). However, due to the characteristics of this 
crime—i.e., emotional and physical intimacy between offenders and victims, repeated 
victimization, direct effect on other family members, etc.—policy makers as well as 
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scholars have paid much attention to this type of crime. Thus, it is not surprising that 
police departments have also invested their resources in tackling this issue.  
Missing child units have consistently increased—from 45.2% of police agencies 
having the units in 2000 to 52.7% and 53.7% in 2003 and 2007 respectively—even while 
there has been no concurrent evidence that the number of missing child cases has 
increased. On the contrary, during the last decades of the 20
th
 century, missing child cases 
continuously decreased (Hammer, Finkelhor, Sedlak, and Porcellini, 2004). Police 
agencies with written policy or specialized missing units have been shown to be more 
aggressive in investigating missing child cases (Speirs, 1998). Thus, the increase of 
missing child units can be understood in terms of police recognition that even a small 
number of missing child cases is an important issue to address. Also, political pressure 
can be a factor in agencies’ increased reliance on the missing child units.  
The expansion of cyber-crime units has been even more dramatic. In 2000, fewer 
than 20% of police agencies in the sample had specialized cyber-crime units. Less than a 
decade later, however, that percentage had increased more than two-fold—close to 40% 
of agencies were equipped with the units that could tackle crime committed in cyber 
space.  
Cyber-crime is important not only among private parties. This relatively new type 
of crime poses a challenge to local law enforcement agencies because police 
organizations need to be equipped with new technology and skills to address diverse 
issues (Goodman, 1997). Child pornography, identify theft, fraud, and cyber bullying are 
some examples of cyber-crime. Therefore, though some critics lament the lack of 
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attention on the crime in the virtual world, police agencies have expanded their field of 
duty to the virtual space during the last decade (Davis, 2012).  
The percentage of crime analysis units also grew in this period. In 2000, just over 
half of agencies had crime analysis units. The percentage kept increasing, and in 2007, 
more than 66% of police departments had crime analysis units within their organizations. 
Increase of crime analysis functionality can be from the recognition that support for 
crime scene investigation through scientific analysis is essential in catching offenders and 
proving evidence to courts. The trend identified in Figure 5.1 suggests that police 
organizations were increasingly spending more resources on this area.  
Internal affairs units have also increased. Close to 77% of police departments 
already had a unit responsible for maintaining the integrity of officers’ behavior in 2000. 
This number increased to 83.5% of the sample in 2007. Addressing misconduct or 
corruption by a few police officers in an appropriate manner plays a significant role in 
keeping the integrity and trust of police departments (Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2009). Although research has not evaluated the effectiveness of the 
units (Skogan and Frydl, 2004), police agencies have nonetheless increasingly formed 
internal affairs units since the early 2000s.  
In short, descriptive statistics from 2000 to 2007 show that police agencies 
responded to social changes and increased public awareness by creating relevant 
specialized units that are committed to tackle problems in the communities.   
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DECREASE OF OPERATION 
As shown in Figure 5.1, other categories of crime showed the opposite pattern of 
subunit utilization. For instance, police agencies seemed to decrease the operation of 
juvenile crime units. In 2000, more than 60% of police agencies had specialized units 
solely devoted to juvenile crimes. However, the percentage decreased to 58.3% in 2003 
and to 55.5% in 2007. Crime committed by juveniles (i.e., aged under 18) and juvenile 
victimization also decreased since early 1990s (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006), but it is not 
clear why police organizations decreasingly relied on specialized units specifically for 
juveniles.  
The number of drug education units also decreased in the same period. Police 
have been involved in numerous school-based educational programs, notably through 
Drug Abuse Resistance Education and Gang Resistance Education and Training. 
Research on the effectiveness of such program, however, yielded mixed results (see 
Ennet, Tobler, Ringwalt, and Flewelling, 1994; Esbensen and Osgood, 1999). The data in 
this study showed that police agencies relied less on specialized drug education units in 
2007 as compared to 2000.  
Temporal shifts in the number of drunk driver, repeat offender, and gang units did 
not seem to follow any particular pattern. For instance, in 2000, 28.4% of local police 
departments had drunk driver units. The percentage decreased to 27.8% in 2003, but then 
increased to 36.7% in 2007. Repeat offender units showed a similar pattern. More than 
13% of police departments operated repeat offender units in 2000. After a small drop in 
2003 (11.4%), however, the percentage increased to more than 16% in 2007. Also, close 
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to 45% of police agencies ran specialized gang units in 2000. However, the percentage 
dropped to 38.7% in 2003 before increasing to 54.4% in 2007.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not clear whether police agencies set up 
specialized units from rational decision-making to tackle increasing local problems or 
from political or media pressures. However, it is clear that police departments have 
increasingly relied on some subunits (e.g., bias crime units, cyber-crime units, crime 
analysis units, internal affairs units, etc.), while some other units (e.g., juvenile crime 
units, drug education units, etc.) have been decreasingly utilized by police organizations.  
 
OPERATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING UNITS 
Table 5.1 indicates that police organizations varied in operating community 
policing units across time. For instance, while 202 agencies (31.5% of sample) 
maintained community policing units from 2000 to 2007, 105 departments (16.4% ) did 
not have dedicated units responsible for implementing community policing activities. In 
other words, close to half of police agencies in the sample maintained the same approach 
to the matter of CP Units throughout the course of the years studied; about 32% always 
had one and about 16% never did.  
For the remaining 52.1% of agencies, however, specialized community policing 
units came and went during the seven-year period. About 10% of agencies had CP Units 
in 2000 and 2003, but did not have CP Units in 2007. However, about 9% of agencies 
had CP Units in 2000, no CP Units in 2003, and CP Units again in 2007. In short, a look 
at the data disclosed some notable temporal fluctuations among agencies with respect to 
the presence of specialized CP Units goes.  
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Table 5.1. Change of Community Policing Units from 2000 to 2007 (n=641) 
LEMAS 2000 LEMAS 2003 LEMAS 2007 Frequency 
CP Unit 
CP Unit 
CP Unit 202 (31.5%) 
No Unit 81 (12.6%) 
No Unit 
CP Unit 59 (9.2%) 
No Unit 61 (9.5%) 
No Unit 
CP Unit 
CP Unit 57 (8.9%) 
No Unit 34 (5.3%) 
No Unit 
CP Unit 42 (6.6%) 
No Unit 105 (16.4%) 
n   641 (100%) 
 
I also separately examined Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police 
Departments regarding their operation of CP Units over time. As Table 5.2 shows, similar 
patterns were identified in both groups. A total of 53 out of 218 sheriffs’ departments 
(26.8%) had CP Units across all three waves of the data collection period. During the 
same period, 33.6% of municipal police departments consistently had CP Units. There 
were also some Sheriffs’ Department and Municipal Police Departments that did not 
operate CP Units at any point during the years examined—27.8% and 11.3%, 
respectively.  
Other departments were not consistent where the presence of specialized CP Units 
was concerned—45.4% of Sheriffs’ Departments and 55.1% of Municipal Police 
Departments. Examining these fluctuations further, 10.1% of Sheriffs’ Departments had 
CP Units in 2000 and 2003, but they did not have the same unit in 2007. Also, 7.2% of 
Municipal Police Departments did not operate CP Units in 2000, but did in 2003 and 
2007.  
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Table 5.2. Change of Community Policing Units by Type of Agencies (n=641) 
LEMAS 2000 LEMAS 2003 LEMAS 2007 
Frequency 
Sheriff’s Dept. Municipal PD 
CP Units 
CP Units 
CP Units 53 (26.8%) 149 (33.6%) 
No Units 20 (10.1%) 61 (13.8%) 
No Units 
CP Units 12 (6.1%) 47 (10.6%) 
No Units 24 (12.1%) 37 (8.4%) 
No Units 
CP Units 
CP Units 15 (7.6%) 42 (9.5%) 
No Units 9 (4.5%) 25 (5.6%) 
No Units 
CP Units 10 (5.1%) 32 (7.2%) 
No Units 55 (27.8%) 50 (11.3%) 
n   198 (100%) 443 (100%) 
 
 
In short, variations in operating CP Units existed both in Sheriffs’ Departments 
and Municipal Police Departments. While many police agencies kept consistency in 
management of a subunit for community policing (either through operating or not 
operating a CP Unit), the majority of agencies altered their operation of CP Units over 
time.   
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CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS 
 Table 5.3 reports the bivariate correlations for all variables included in Analysis I 
(see Table 4.2 for details about Analysis I and Analysis II). As the table shows, the CP 
Units 2000 variable was significantly correlated with every dependent variable. Also, the 
CP Units 2003 variable was significantly correlated with all dependent variables in the 
analysis.   
Correlations among variables included in Analysis II are shown in Table 5.4. CP 
Units 2003 was correlated with half of the dependent variables: Community Engagement 
2003, Problem-Solving 2003, and Organizational Transformation 2003 variables. 
However, CP Units 2007 was significantly correlated with all dependent variables except 
for the Community Engagement 2003 variable.  
 
INDEPENDENT T-TESTS 
 Independent t-tests were used to assess whether if the means of each community 
policing element for two groups (agencies with CP Units vs. agencies without CP Units) 
were significantly different. In other words, t-tests were performed to find if police 
departments with CP Units have different community policing activities compared to 
agencies without such units. This analysis was repeated across three waves of data. Thus, 
nine separate t-tests were conducted to see whether the means differed across three 
elements of community policing program implementation.  
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Table 5.3. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the LEMAS 2000 and the LEMAS 2003 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Unit2000 1                
2. Unit2003 0.26** 1               
3. CE2000 0.15** 0.15** 1              
4. CE2003 0.11** 0.20** 0.27** 1             
5. PS2000 0.12** 0.15** 0.45** 0.19** 1            
6. PS2003 0.09* 0.17** 0.21** 0.41** 0.40** 1           
7. OT2000 0.19** 0.12** 0.36** 0.19** 0.40** 0.27** 1          
8. OT2003 0.11** 0.21** 0.20** 0.31** 0.22** 0.41** 0.20** 1         
9. Strength2000 0.14** 0.16** 0.09* 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.20** 0.12** 1        
10.Strength2003 0.12** 0.17** 0.09* 0.08* 0.07 0.05 0.20** 0.13** 0.98** 1       
11. OD2000 -0.02 -0.04 0.09* 0.13** 0.14** 0.15** 0.04 -0.03 -0.38** -0.36** 1      
12. OD2003 -0.17 -0.11** -0.21** -0.23** -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** -0.15** -0.20** -0.22** -0.01 1     
13. Budget2000 -0.07 -0.10* 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.42** -0.42** 0.55** 0.00** 1    
14. Budget2003 -0.04 -0.11** 0.04 0.01 0.08* 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42** -0.46** 0.50** 0.12** 0.67** 1   
15. Crime2000 0.13** 0.13** 0.16** 0.09* 0.12** 0.11** 0.23** 0.14** 0.68** 0.68** -0.16** -0.26** -0.31** -0.33** 1  
16. Crime2003 0.15** 0.12** 0.16** 0.08* 0.16** 0.11** 0.23** 0.15** 0.66** 0.67** -0.17** -0.25** -0.31** -0.33** 0.93** 1 
Notes: CE2000 stands for the community engagement element of community policing in year 2000. PS stands for the problem-solving element. OT stands for organizational transformation. OD stands 
for occupational differentiation.  
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Table 5.4. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the LEMAS 2003 and the LEMAS 2007 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. CPUnit2003 1                
2. CPUnit2007 0.28** 1               
3. CE2003 0.16** 0.08 1              
4. CE2007 0.02 0.23** 0.22** 1             
5. PS2003 0.11** 0.09* 0.47** 0.22** 1            
6. PS2007 0.06 0.31** 0.25** 0.46** 0.35** 1           
7. OT2003 0.22** 0.18** 0.18** 0.17** 0.26** 0.28** 1          
8. OT2007 0.05 0.28** 0.18** 0.35** 0.19** 0.49** 0.16** 1         
9. Strength2003 0.17** 0.13** 0.09* 0.09* 0.06 0.10** 0.13** 0.21** 1        
10.Strength2007 0.18** 0.16** 0.07 0.09* 0.08* 0.12** 0.14** 0.21** 0.94** 1       
11. OD2003 -0.10* -0.09* -0.21** -0.20** -0.11** -0.13** -0.14** -0.18** -0.22** -0.19** 1      
12. OD2007 -0.08* -0.10** -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09* -0.50** -0.52** 0.05 1     
13. Budget2003 -0.10** -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11** 0.08* -0.04 -0.01 -0.45** -0.42** 0.09* 0.53** 1    
14. Budget2007 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.10* 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.42** -0.45** -0.03 0.64** 0.68** 1   
15. Crime2003 0.12** 0.11** 0.15** 0.18** 0.16** 0.14** 0.17** 0.22** 0.67** 0.63** -0.26** -0.38** -0.32** -0.33** 1  
16. Crime2007 0.15** 0.09* 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** 0.12** 0.17** 0.19** 0.65** 0.65** -0.23** -0.40** -0.36** -0.37** 0.91** 1 
Notes: CE2003 stands for the community engagement element of community policing in year 2003. PS stands for the problem-solving element; OT stands for organizational transformation. OD stands 
for occupational differentiation.  
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The LEMAS 2000 
A statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP 
Units and those without the units in the community engagement element of community 
policing activities (t (624)=-3.84, p<.05). Agencies with CP Units had a higher level of 
the community engagement dimension of community policing activities (M=6.65, 
SD=2.65) than those without CP Units (M=5.77, SD=2.82).  
There was also a significant difference between police agencies with CP Units 
and those without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing 
activities (t (624)=-2.92, p<.05). Police organizations with CP Units had a higher level of 
problem-solving element of community policing activities (M=2.96, SD=2.07) than 
agencies without CP Units (M=2.44, SD=2.18).  
Finally, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with 
CP Units and without the units in the organizational transformation aspect of community 
policing activities (t (624)=-4.96, p<.05). Like the above two elements, organizational 
transformation elements of community policing activities were higher in police agencies 
with CP Units (M=2.68, SD=1.17) than departments without CP Units (M=2.19, 
SD=1.24).  
 
The LEMAS 2003 
A t-test indicated that a statistically significant difference existed between police 
agencies with CP Units and without the units in the community engagement element of 
community policing activities (t (620)=-5.01, p<.05). That is, CP Units were associated 
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with a higher level of the community engagement dimension of community policing 
activities.  
Also, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP 
Units and without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing 
activities (t (622)=-4.41, p<.05). CP Units seem to be associated with a higher level of 
problem-solving of community policing activities.  
Lastly, a t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between 
police agencies with CP Units and without the units in the organizational transformation 
aspect of community policing activities (t (579)=-5.21, p<.05). Unlike the result from the 
LEMAS 2000, police departments with CP Units showed a higher level of the 
organizational transformation elements of community policing activities compared to 
agencies without CP Units.  
 
The LEMAS 2007 
A t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between police 
agencies with CP Units and without the units in the community engagement element of 
community policing activities (t (628)=-6.02, p<.05). That is, CP Units appear to be 
associated with a higher level of the community engagement dimension of community 
policing activities.  
Also, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP 
Units and without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing 
activities (t (631)=-8.05, p<.05). Results showed that CP Units seem to be associated with 
a higher level of the problem-solving element of community policing activities.  
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Last, a t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between 
police agencies with CP Units with and without the units in the organizational 
transformation aspect of community policing activities (t (596)=-6.98, p<.05). Unlike the 
result from the LEMAS 2000, police departments with CP Units showed a higher level of 
the organizational transformation elements of community policing activities compared to 
agencies without CP Units.  
 
Summary 
Results from three waves of data suggested that specialized community policing 
units were positively associated with community policing program implementation. 
Police departments with such specialized units performed more activities that involved 
the community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation aspects 
of community policing. In short, the results suggest that the creation of community 
policing units significantly affects program implementation by police departments.  
 
LINEAR PANEL ANALYSIS 
Two separate analyses were conducted to see the change and the effect of change 
on community policing units: Analysis I for the change of all agencies between 2000 and 
2003 and Analysis II for the change between 2003 and 2007. As mentioned earlier, I 
decided to conduct two separate analyses due to some discrepancies of items included in 
three waves of the LEMAS survey (see Chapter 4 for details).  
Panel analysis results for Sheriffs’ Department and Municipal Police Departments 
between 2000 and 2003 will be presented below, followed by results for 2003 and 2007. 
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In addition, by examining significant differences between coefficients across two groups, 
I investigated the interactive effects of different types of agencies (i.e., Sheriffs’ 
Department versus Municipal Police Department) on each element of community 
policing activities (see below for details). A z-test then compared coefficients of 
independent variables in each group.  
 
ANALYSIS I AND ANALYSIS II FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS 
Analysis I 
 Analysis I employs the LEMAS 2000 and 2003 waves of data that included both 
Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police Departments. Table 5.5 provides the results 
of linear panel analysis of the association between CP Units and police organizations’ 
implementation of three elements of community policing. In each element, Model 1 
included only CP Units as an independent variable, while Model 2 addressed four control 
variables to investigate the possible mediating effects of police strength, occupational 
differentiation, operating budget, and crime rate variables.  
The presence of CP Units was significantly (p<0.01) and positively associated 
with the community engagement element. In other words, police agencies with CP Units 
were more likely to implement community policing activities that involve close 
interaction with residents and other community members and groups.  
Model  2 included three intra-organizational factors (i.e., police strength, 
occupational differentiation, and operating budget (logged)) and crime rate as control 
variables. In this model, CP Units was still significantly (p<0.05) related to the 
community engagement dimension of community policing. Also, the direction of the 
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relation was not changed. That is, controlling for the effect of police strength, 
civilianization, budget, and crime rate, police agencies with CP Units implemented on 
average 0.52 more community policing programs that involved close interactions with 
their residents. Thus, the initial relationship did hold even when controlling for four 
possible spurious factors.  
Among control variables, only occupational differentiation was positively 
associated with the community engagement element. Thus, the data showed that police 
departments with more civilian personnel were more likely to implement community 
policing programs that engage their citizens. However, other control variables failed to 
achieve statistically significant associations with community engagement programs.  
The association between CP Units and the problem-solving element of 
community policing is revealed in the second column of Table 5.5. Results indicate that 
CP Units were not significantly associated with community policing activities that focus 
on the adoption of new approaches in solving community problems. Similarly, the 
analysis disclosed that none of the control variables had a significant relationship with the 
problem-solving element of community policing.  
The third column of Table 5.5 shows the effect of CP Units on the organizational 
transformation dimension of community policing. Model 1, which included only CP 
Units as an independent variable, indicated that agencies with specialized community 
policing units were more likely to implement the organizational transformation aspect of 
community policing (p<0.01) than were their counterparts without such units. When four 
control variables (i.e., police strength, occupational differentiation, operating budget 
(logged), and crime rate) were introduced, the significance of CP Units did not disappear. 
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In other words, the control variables did not mediate the association between CP Units 
and agencies’ activities where the organizational change aspect of community policing 
was concerned.  
Among intra-organizational factors and crime rate, only occupational 
differentiation was significantly and positively associated with community policing 
activities that focused on changing organizational priorities. That is, police agencies with 
more civilians are more likely to focus on the organizational transformation aspects of 
community policing net of other variables in the model. Also, three control variables—
police strength, budget, and crime rate—did not reach significance.  
In short, based on data from LEMAS 2000 and 2003, the presence of CP Units 
was significantly associated with community engagement and organizational 
transformation aspects of community policing. Agencies with specialized units solely 
devoted to community policing were more likely to implement programs that involve 
interactions with residents and reflect a change in organizational priorities.  
 
Analysis II 
Analysis II employed the LEMAS 2003 and 2007 waves of data for all types of 
agencies. Table 5.6 reports the association between CP Units and three different elements 
of community policing program implementation during 2003 and 2007. The community 
engagement element of community policing is reported in the first column of Table 5.6. 
Model 1, which only included CP Units, showed that agencies with specialized 
community policing units were more likely to perform activities that highlight the close 
interaction between police organizations and residents than their counterparts without CP 
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Units. Even when four control variables were introduced in the model as in Model 2, the 
significance of CP Units remained (p<0.01). It is also worth noting that none of the 
control variables were significantly associated with the CP Units measure in Model 2. In 
short, as in Analysis I, police departments with CP Units were more likely to perform 
community engagement aspects of community policing programs.  
The second column of Table 5.6 shows the association between CP Units and 
police agencies’ implementation of the problem-solving element of community policing 
activities. Again, linear panel analysis revealed that CP Units were significantly (p<0.01) 
associated with the problem-solving dimension of community policing activities while 
holding other variables in the model constant. That is, agencies with the specialized units 
were more likely to have programs that stress the problem-solving approach in tackling 
local problems net of other factors.  
The relationship between CP Units and the organizational transformation 
dimension of community policing is provided in the third column of Table 5.6. CP Units 
were significantly (p<0.01) and positively associated with agencies’ activities that 
emphasized organizational investment in officers’ training and evaluation in community 
policing activities. The inclusion of four control variables did not change the relationship 
between CP Units and the organizational transformation dimensions of community 
policing program implementation. In other words, controlling for police strength, civilian 
employees, operating budget, and crime rate, CP Units were positively related to the 
organizational transformation elements of community policing implementation. An 
average of 0.38 more organizational transformation programs were implemented in 
police agencies with CP Units relative to ones without such specialized units.   
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Table 5.5. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing (2000-2003) 
 
Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Unit 0.67 0.25** 0.52 0.25* 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.36 0.11** 0.32 0.11** 
Police Strength   0.07 0.07   -0.01 0.04   0.02 0.03 
Occup. Diff.   0.03 0.01**   -0.01 0.00   0.01 0.00** 
Budget   -0.67 0.41   -0.27 0.26   -0.16 0.18 
Crime Rate   -2.13 10.15   -11.54 6.45   3.44 4.48 
n 1244  1244  1246  1246  1203  1203  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
 
Table 5.6. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing (2003-2007) 
 
Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Unit 1.08 0.22** 1.03 0.23** 0.48 0.10** 0.49 0.10** 0.38 0.10** 0.38 0.10** 
Police Strength   0.06 0.04   -0.00 0.02   -0.00 0.02 
Occup. Diff.   0.01 0.01   0.00 0.00   -0.00 0.00 
Budget   -0.23 0.28   0.08 0.13   0.16 0.12 
Crime Rate   -11.80 8.47   1.34 3.76   -2.94 3.83 
n 1249  1249  1252  1252  1186  1186  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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In short, linear panel analyses of the longitudinal data from the LEMAS 2003 and 
2007 showed that CP Units were significantly associated with all three elements of 
community policing activities. That is, the positive effect of specialized units on program 
implementation was consistent in all three elements of community policing. In summary, 
agencies with specialized units solely devoted to community policing were more likely to 
perform three distinctive dimensions of community policing compared to departments 
without CP Units.  
 
FURTHER ANALYSES 
As discussed in Chapter 3, local police departments in the United States are 
highly heterogeneous in terms of their operations, personnel management, and priorities 
in daily policing. One notable difference across departments is agency type. Sheriff and 
police departments typically have notably different sorts of responsibilities and thus 
different organizational structures from one another. Thus, I subdivided the sample into 
two subsamples to investigate whether the association between CP Units and three 
elements of community policing differed depending on the types of local police agencies: 
Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police Departments. After conducting separate 
analyses for these two groups in 2000-2003 and 2003-2007, I examined whether any 
observed differences between the two sorts of organizations were statistically significant.  
 
Sheriffs’ Department in 2000-2003 
  The effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments based on the LEMAS 2000 and 
2003 data is reported in Table 5.7. The analyses undertaken disclosed no significant 
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effect of CP Units on any of the three elements of CP programs (p=0.07). Also, inclusion 
of control variables did not change the impact of CP Units on any of the three different 
elements of community policing—that is, the effect of CP Units was non-significant in 
Model 2, which included four control variables.  
Moreover, it is interesting that control variables are differentially associated with 
each element of community policing (i.e., dependent variables). First, in the community 
engagement dimension, only occupational differentiation achieved statistical significance 
(p<0.05). That is, Sheriffs’ Departments with a high rate of civilian staff were more likely 
to implement community policing activities that involve close interaction and 
communication with their citizens. Second, the operating budget variable—measured by 
total budget divided by the number of sworn officers—was negatively associated with the 
problem-solving element of community policing (p<0.05). Thus, based on this result, 
Sheriffs’ Departments with more financial capabilities are less likely to implement 
problem-solving activities. Lastly, crime rate is positively related to the organizational 
transformation dimension of community policing (p<0.05). In other words, the more 
Sheriffs’ Departments experienced higher crime rates, the more likely the agencies were 
to adopt innovative organizational approaches to tackle local problems.  
 
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 
Table 5.8 reports the association between CP Units in Municipal Police 
Departments (between 2000 and 2003) and the three elements of community policing 
activities (i.e., community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational 
transformation). In short, Model 1 of each analysis, which addressed only the effect of 
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CP Units, showed that specialized units in Municipal Police Departments were 
significantly associated with each dimension of program implementation in general.
4
 
When control variables were introduced in each model (Model 2), the effect of CP Units 
did not change.  
First, holding other control variables in the model constant, the effect of CP Units 
in Municipal Police departments on the community engagement element of community 
policing was marginal and positive (b=0.50, p=0.10). For instance, municipal police 
departments with specialized community policing units were predicted to implement 0.50 
more programs that engage community members than their counterparts without such 
units. Among control variables, the effect of occupational differentiation was statistically 
significant and positive (b=0.03, p<0.01). Thus, the more municipal police agencies had 
civilian employees, the more likely it was that they performed activities that focused on 
the involvement of community members.  
Second, CP Units were also associated with the problem-solving element of 
community policing, even though the statistical significance of Model 2 was marginal 
(b=0.35, p=0.08). When control variables were introduced, the significance level did not 
substantively change (b=0.33, p=0.09).  
Third, municipal police agencies with CP Units performed considerably more 
community policing activities of the organizational transformation element (b=0.32, 
p<0.01). That is, taking all four control variables into account, CP Units in Municipal 
Police Departments between 2000 and 2003 was positively associated with activities that 
engage in setting up new organizational priorities.  
                                                          
4
 The only exception is the association between CP Units and the problem-solving element. However, this 
relationship was also marginal (p=0.08). 
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Table 5.7. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments (2000-2003) 
 Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Unit 0.82 0.45 0.50 0.46 -0.34 0.27 -0.33 0.28 0.35 0.19 0.30 0.19 
Police Strength   0.12 0.09   -0.08 0.06   -0.03 0.04 
Occup. Diff.   0.02 0.01*   -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.00 
Budget   -0.46 0.63   -0.77 0.38*   -0.18 0.28 
Crime Rate   35.75 48.75   14.71 29.64   54.35 23.93* 
n 384  384  384  384  361  361  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
 
Table 5.8. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments (2000-2003) 
 Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Unit 0.61 0.31* 0.50 0.31 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.20 0.36 0.13** 0.32 0.13* 
Police Strength   -0.01 0.11   0.06 0.07   0.07 0.05 
Occup. Diff.   0.03 0.01**   -0.01 0.01   0.01 0.00** 
Budget   -0.71 0.54   -0.06 0.35   -0.15 0.23 
Crime Rate   -3.91 10.69   -12.02 6.84   1.48 4.69 
n 860  860  862  862  842  842  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Moreover, as in the case of the community engagement dimension, occupational 
differentiation was found to be associated with program implementation that focused on 
the organizational transformation aspect (b=0.01, p<0.01). 
 
Interactive Effects 
As briefly discussed above, the fact that the relationship between any given pair 
of variables in one subsample is significant and not significant in a second subsample 
does not necessarily mean that the effect of the predictor is different in the two groups. 
For instance, the result that CP Units was a significant factor in Sheriff’s Departments but 
not in Municipal Police Department does not necessarily mean that the effect differed 
across agency types. Therefore, I compared the coefficients of each community policing 
element for Sheriff’s and Municipal Police Departments by using the following formula 
suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998):  
 
  
      
√    
      
 
    
    
where b1 is the slope coefficient for the independent variable for Sheriffs’ Departments, 
b2 is the slope coefficient for the same variable for Municipal Police Departments, and 
    
  and     
  are the coefficient variances for each group. As the formula shows, this 
formula produces z score that will indicate whether or not the difference of coefficients is 
statistically significant (Paternoster et al., 1998).  
As noted above, CP Units had a positive and significant relationship with the 
community engagement aspect of community policing. Also, occupational differentiation 
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had a significant association with the same dimension of community policing both for 
Sheriff’s Departments and for Municipal Police Departments. However, there were no 
significant differences in the magnitude of the effects for any of the independent 
variables (including CP Units and occupational differentiation) on community 
engagement across the two types of agencies (see Appendix 3 for all z scores in each 
model).  
In addition, with respect to the problem-solving element, no significant 
differences were found in the magnitude of the effects of independent variables between 
Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments.  
Last, CP Units and occupational differentiation had a positive and significant 
relationship with the organizational transformation aspect of community policing only for 
Municipal Police Departments. However, the magnitude of the relationship was not 
significantly different between two types of agencies. Crime rate had a positive and 
significant relationship with the organizational transformation element of community 
policing only for Sheriff’s Departments. Additionally, the magnitude of the effects 
differed significantly between two types of agencies (z=2.193, p<0.05).  
 
Sheriffs’ Department in 2003-2007 
The analyses that employed the LEMAS 2003 and 2007 are presented in Table 
5.9. First, CP Units were not found to be associated with the community engagement 
element of community policing, even though the association approached significance 
(b=0.82, p=0.09). When four control variables were considered in Model 2, the effect of 
CP Units did not reach a significance level (p=0.14).  
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Second, the CP Units variable was a statistically significant factor in the 
association with the problem-solving dimension of community policing activities. 
Sheriffs’ Departments with CP Units are more likely to perform activities that necessitate 
the introduction of new strategies to solve local crime problems (b=0.66, p<0.01). Also, 
the relationship was not mediated by control variables in Model 2 (b=0.67, p<0.01).  
Last, CP Units were also statistically significantly related to the organizational 
transformation element of community policing (b=0.45, p<0.05). Even when four control 
variables were introduced, the association did not change (b=0.52, p<0.01). In other 
words, controlling for police strength, occupational differentiation, operating budget, and 
crime rate, Sheriffs’ Departments with specialized community policing units are more 
likely to put programs in place that focus on the organizational priorities toward training 
and evaluation of community policing.  
 
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 
The association between CP Units in Municipal Police Departments and the three 
distinct elements of community policing between 2003 and 2007 is reported in Table 
5.10. Model 1 of each column shows that there were statistically significant relationships 
between CP Units and each of the three dimensions of community policing activity under 
study. When control variables were introduced, the results indicate that CP Units was still 
significantly associated with each community policing element.  
First, as Model 2 in the first column shows, net of other variables, CP Units were 
found to be positively related to the community engagement element of community 
policing (b=1.14, p<0.01). Municipal Police Departments with CP Units implemented an 
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average of 1.14 more community policing activities related to the community 
engagement.  
Second, the effect of CP Units also remained significant and positive in Model 2 
of the problem-solving element (b=0.45, p<0.01). That is, holding other independent 
variables constant, Municipal Police Departments that operated with CP Units 
implemented on average 0.45 more community policing activities that focused on the 
problem-solving dimension.  
Finally, the association between CP Units and organizational transformation 
activities by Municipal Police Departments was also statistically significant and positive, 
as was shown in Model 2 (b=0.35, p<0.01). In other words, police departments were 
more likely to implement programs that involve setting up new priorities toward training 
and evaluation of community policing between 2003 and 2007 controlling for other 
variables in the model.  
 
Interactive Effects 
Unlike the results of the 2000-2003 data, here CP Units had a significant and 
positive relationship with all three elements of community policing both for Sheriff’s 
Departments and Municipal Police Departments.
5
 The comparison of coefficients 
between two types of agencies revealed that the magnitude of the effects of CP Units was 
significantly different from each other only for the problem-solving element of 
community policing. That is, Sheriff’s Departments were significantly more likely to 
                                                          
5
 The only exception was in the case of Sheriff’s Department in community engagement element aspect of 
community policing. However, the effect also approached significance (p=0.07).  
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implement problem-solving aspects of community policing than are Municipal Police 
Departments (z=4.020, p<0.05).  
 
Summary 
Two separate analyses (2000-2003 and 2003-2007) in Sheriffs’ and Municipal 
Police Departments showed slightly different results from each other. Overall, analysis of 
the 2000-2003 data showed that the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments 
on all three elements of community policing considered in this study was statistically 
significant, while this was not the case among Sheriff’s Departments. That is, Municipal 
Police Departments with CP Units are more likely to implement each dimension of 
community policing programs. It must be noted, however, that the differences between 
sheriff and police agencies were not statistically significant.  
Regarding results from 2003-2007 data analyses, the change of CP Units had a 
positive and significant effect on three elements of community policing, both in Sheriff’s 
Departments and Municipal Police Departments. That is, the creation of CP Units affects 
the increase of all three elements of community policing activities across both types of 
agencies. In addition, the direct effect of CP Units was not mediated by other control 
variables. These findings imply that change of CP Units had a direct effect on three 
elements of community policing program implementations in both types of agencies. In 
other words, the creation of CP Units affects the increase of all three elements of 
community policing activities among Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police 
Departments.  
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The comparison of coefficients revealed that the magnitude of the effects of CP 
Units on the problem-solving dimension of community policing was significantly 
different between Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments, while the 
other two elements (i.e., community engagement and organizational transformation) did 
not show significant differences between two types of agencies.  
This chapter attempted to answer two research questions: (1) descriptions of 
change of specialized police units; and (2) the effect of such units on the change of 
community policing program implementation. First, the results indicated that local police 
agencies in the United States from 2000 to 2007 did not operate CP Units in a similar 
manner across time and place. While the majority of agencies continued to operate (or 
not operate) CP Units during the first decade of the 21
st
 century, the remaining police 
agencies were not firm in their consistent operation of the specialized units.  
Second, the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing revealed 
somewhat complex patterns. Overall, police agencies with CP Units were more likely to 
perform each dimension of community policing activities both in 2000-2003 and 2003-
2007 periods. However, when samples were subdivided into Sheriffs’ Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments, different patterns were identified in the association 
between the CP Units and community policing program implementation. CP Units in 
Municipal Police Departments were positively associated with each element of 
community policing activities, and this association was constant in both periods.  
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Table 5.9. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments (2003-2007) 
 Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Units 0.82 0.48 0.73 0.50 0.66 0.20** 0.67 0.21** 0.45 0.19* 0.52 0.20** 
Police Strength   0.06 0.09   0.02 0.04   -0.06 0.04 
Occup. Diff.   0.00 0.01   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Budget   -0.40 0.51   0.18 0.21   0.06 0.21 
Crime Rate   -30.37 43.82   -26.88 18.43   20.12 20.22 
n 385  385  387  387  355  355  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.0 
 
Table 5.10. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments (2003-2007) 
 
Community Engagement Problem-Solving Organizational Transformation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
CP Units 1.16 0.25** 1.14 0.25** 0.43 0.11** 0.45 0.11** 0.36 0.11** 0.35 0.11** 
Police Strength   0.08 0.06   0.03 0.03   0.03 0.03 
Occup. Diff.   0.02 0.01   0.01 0.00   -0.00 0.00 
Budget   -0.17 0.36   0.03 0.16   0.19 0.16 
Crime Rate   -7.80 8.73   3.73 3.94   -3.80 4.04 
n 864  864  865  865  831  831  
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
107 
 
With regard to Sheriffs’ Departments, results suggest that the effect of CP Units 
was not constant over time. Between 2000 and 2003, CP Units failed to show significant 
association with all three elements of community policing activities. In 2003 and 2007, 
however, Sheriffs’ Departments with CP Units were more likely to implement each 
dimension of community policing program implementation.  
Finally, the comparison of coefficients showed that the effect of CP Units differed 
between the two types of agencies only for the problem-solving aspect of community 
policing in the 2003-2007 period. Except for this element, the effect of CP Units on 
community policing activities was not different across two types of agencies.   
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation examined two related issues: temporal changes in the operation 
of specialized community policing units (CP Units) by local law enforcement agencies 
and the effect of such specialized units on the change of three distinct elements of 
community policing activities in such agencies. In particular, I performed linear panel 
analysis using three waves of data from the LEMAS to investigate the changes of 
community policing outputs and the factors that significantly contributed to such 
changes.  
Policing scholars have been critical of the increased creation of diverse 
specialized units by local police departments, due in part to possible inter-unit conflicts. 
Specifically, after the widespread introduction of the community policing philosophy, 
proponents of this approach argued that police organizations need to despecialize their 
structure—i.e., decrease specialized units—and their personnel (e.g., Goldstein, 1987). 
This dissertation is one of very few studies to look at the link between the presence of 
specialized units and organizational outputs. 
One of several advances this dissertation made in the study of specialized police 
units involved the nature of the analyses performed. Previous studies were largely limited 
to cross-sectional analyses (see Langworthy, 2002). While these studies provided some 
insight into organizational behavior at one point in time, they were not able to draw 
conclusions regarding how police organizational structure tends to evolve and change 
across time. This dissertation was an effort to trace such changes—specifically, changes 
of outputs in three distinct elements of community policing activities. By using linear 
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panel techniques to control for time-invariant factors, the analyses yielded useful 
evidence about how specialized units affected the change in outputs.  
 
Operations of Specialized Units 
The results of descriptive and inferential analyses revealed complex pictures of 
changes and roles of specialized CP Units of the agencies that responded to the LEMAS 
sample. First, wide variations in the operation of specialized police units among police 
agencies seemed to exist between 2000 and 2007. Proponents of contingency theory may 
argue that police departments are more likely to create specialized units to tackle newly 
emerging social problems in an efficient and effective manner (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). In fact, the increase of some specialized units (e.g., cyber-crime, hate crime, 
missing child, and terrorism units) seems to reflect social changes—in particular ,after the 
late 1990s—and police departments’ responses to tackle diverse problems arising from 
such changes.  
An alternative explanation is that, as some institutional theorists have suggested 
(e.g., Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Katz, 2001), police agencies may be vulnerable to 
pressures from powerful actors in their communities, notably local elected officials, 
media, and special interest groups. As Skogan and Frydl (2004:310) argued: 
Creating a relatively small but highly focused specialist unit to cope with a given 
problem may do little to reduce that problem, but it does a great deal to alleviate 
pressure from the community without disrupting many organizational routines.  
In fact, as discussed earlier, prior research supports this institutional perspective, 
but most empirical studies tend to examine a limited type of specialized units—for 
instance, gang units (Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002; Weisel and Shelley, 
2004), bias crime units (Walker and Katz, 1995), or crime analysis units (Giblin, 2006). 
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Further research is necessary to investigate the process underlying the increase (or 
decrease) of specialized units operated by local police departments.  
The decrease of some units can also be interpreted in a similar way. For instance, 
contingency theorists may argue that police agencies’ decreasing reliance on some units 
(e.g., juvenile crime and drug education) may be a sign of strategic changes in dealing 
with some social problems and concerns. According to the institutional perspective, if a 
police department gets rid of a specialized unit, this elimination could be considered as “a 
symbolic gesture” by local residents that the agency does not think the task performed by 
the unit is important (Maguire, 1997:570). Thus, decrease of some specialized units 
among police agencies may mean that the organizations think local communities are 
willing to accept the agencies’ reduced attention to some functions. Further research may 
look into the different dynamics involved in the increase and decrease of specialized 
units.  
 
Effect of Specialized Community Policing Units on Community Policing Outputs 
Linear panel analysis also showed some interesting effects of CP Units on 
community policing outputs. Overall, the results showed that police agencies with CP 
Units were more likely to produce outputs in each element of community policing. When 
samples were divided into two groups (i.e., Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police 
Departments), however, the results were not consistent in both groups.  
First, in Sheriffs’ Departments, CP Units were found to be associated with outputs 
of community policing activities in 2000-2003, but not in the 2003-2007 period. This 
research cannot provide a conclusive interpretation for this discrepancy. As will be 
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shown later, some factors not included in this research might play a role in this different 
association between CP Units and community policing outputs. For instance, considering 
that the leaders of Sheriff’s Departments are directly elected by local residents, it may be 
the case that the leaders of sheriff’s department themselves play an essential role in 
producing community policing outputs. 
Second, results showed that municipal police departments with specialized units 
were more likely to generate outputs in all three dimensions of community policing. The 
positive association between CP Units and community policing outputs held over time, 
even after controlling for numerous other factors that may influence community policing 
activities. In other words, police agencies with CP Units are more likely to produce more 
outputs compared to other agencies without such units, independent of 
intraorganizational factors and crime rate.  
Taken all together, what do these results mean? The results show that the creation 
of community policing units leads to more outputs in all three elements of community 
policing. In other words, the creation of specialized units may lead to increase of outputs 
that the units are intended to produce.  
Of course, the increased community policing outputs do not necessarily equate to 
the increase of positive outcomes (e.g., satisfaction of police, reduction of crime, etc.) per 
se. However, potential inter-unit conflicts or indifference of officers from other units may 
not hinder the community policing program implementation, as has been shown in other 
studies (e.g., Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). In short, along with a symbolic role played by 
a specialized unit, the unit can also produce more outputs after it is created.  
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Limitations 
Like any study, this research is not without limitations. First of all, the “dosage” 
of community policing in each element was not considered. The present study included 
almost every indicator of community policing activities listed in three waves of the 
LEMAS, but these dimensions are not necessarily exhaustive indicators of community 
policing efforts by police agencies. For instance, police agencies having numerous 
partnership agreements with community groups were not differentiated from agencies 
with a single partnership contract.  
Similarly, this dissertation also assumed the consistency of definitions on survey 
items across time and place (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000; Wilson, 2004). In other 
words, the “quality” of community policing was not controlled in this study. For 
example, “partnership” with local groups may not mean the same among all police 
agencies. While some police departments highlight the close interaction with community 
groups, some others may only hold formal meetings intended to disseminate police 
information to residents.  
Second, I assumed for the purposes of analysis that all specialized units might 
function in a similar manner. However, in reality, not all community policing units are 
created equal. CP Units in some police agencies may be equipped with more personnel, 
resources, and other organizational support. In contrast, other units may be left alone 
without receiving organizational attention and resources. The assumption that all 
specialized units with full-time sworn personnel might behave in a similar manner might 
not hold in some agencies.  
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Third, the sample in this research included local police agencies that participated 
in all three waves of data collection. Nevertheless, it is possible that agencies that took 
part in all three surveys may not be the same as their counterparts that chose not to be 
involved in the LEMAS data collection efforts. In other words, these results may not be 
generalizable to all police agencies in the United States, and the arguments based on the 
results may thus be considered tentative and explorative. Also, this research included 
only agencies with one hundred or more officers in any wave of data selection. Thus, the 
results in this research may not be generalizable to small police agencies.  
Lastly, the time interval used in the longitudinal analysis may not be short enough 
to examine the immediate effect of change of CP Units on output production. In two 
separate analyses, the data had three- and four-year gaps. Many organizational and 
environmental changes (e.g., change of leadership, federal funding, and local politics, 
etc.) that are not addressed in this study could have taken place during the period.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This dissertation has shown that specialized units play a role in producing 
community policing outputs in local police departments. However, researchers may want 
to consider other factors for a better understanding of the association between specialized 
units and output production. For instance, future studies should take more 
intraorganizational factors into account in discussing community policing 
implementation.  
First, a police union variable can be introduced because organizational factors are 
not limited to size, occupational differentiation, or budget. Rather, line-staff issues are 
also important in dealing with local police agency operations. For instance, unionized 
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departments have been shown to affect organizational behavior as well as the pay and 
benefits of police officers (Reiss, 1992). Also, agencies’ collective bargaining power is 
negatively associated with the percentage of sustained complaints against police use of 
force (Hickman and Piquero, 2009). Police unions can be a barrier to community 
policing, not only because more responsibilities can fall on officers, but also because line 
officers may think that their position in crime prevention is threatened (Skolnick and 
Bayley, 1988). In fact, unions in police organizations have been regarded as facilitators of 
officers’ salaries and benefits, but also as obstacles to innovative changes in policing 
(Walker and Katz, 2010).  
Second, more socioeconomic variables should be taken into account in future 
research endeavors to see if other environmental factors mediate the association between 
CP Units and the implementation of community policing programs. As Maguire and 
Mastrofski (2000:16) suggested, the new policing philosophy gained popularity among 
practitioners as well as scholars “not because the ideas of community policing are new or 
revolutionary, but because the environment is now conducive to the support and 
nourishment of ideas that earlier fell on barren ground.” In other words, police 
departments situated in different settings are likely to perform community policing in a 
different manner due to different environmental factors.  
The roles and strategies taken by CP Units are shaped depending on their 
situations. For instance, Skogan and Hartnett (1997) found stronger support for police 
among Whites than among African-Americans and Hispanics in Chicago. Also, African-
American and Hispanic residents in Chicago were more likely than White people to think 
that Chicago police are impolite, unconcerned, unhelpful, and unfair. Unfavorable 
115 
 
attitudes toward the police by ethnic minorities may decrease the likelihood of their 
participation in community policing, particularly partnering with law enforcement 
agencies (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Moreover, people who own their own houses and 
have jobs have a higher probability of attending such community policing activities 
(Skogan, 2006b). Thus, investigation of the association between CP Units and 
organizational surroundings may increase our understanding of how specialized units 
perform in a variety of situations.  
Third, the role of influential individuals in implementing diverse community 
policing programs needs to be taken into consideration (Chaiken, 2001; Eck and 
Rosenbaum, 1994; Kitzman and Stanard, 1999; Maguire, 1997). Community policing can 
be implemented in a completely different manner depending on the experiences and 
personalities of top police officers. Specific programs can also be interrupted or 
discontinued when confronted with changing leadership in police departments (Skogan 
and Hartnett, 1997). Lyons (1999: 50) even argued that the major vehicle for community 
policing in the city is not communities, but rather “reform-conscious police managers.”  
In addition, political leaders, especially elected officials, can influence the 
implementation of policing strategies or initiatives. Local politicians have a valid reason 
to introduce a fresh approach when faced with criticism due to rising crime in their 
communities. Recently, studies have started to show that local politicians’ roles may be 
an important variable that can determine the implementation of community policing 
(Chaiken, 2001). For instance, Jacobs (2010: 199) argued that “mayors directly control 
police chiefs in most cities,” which may mean that the role of elected officials cannot be 
excluded in discussing factors that affect police activities. Thus, more research is 
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necessary to examine whether influential local leaders moderate the relationship between 
CP Units and their output.  
Fourth, the role of the federal government’s intervention in community policing 
was not included in this research, but has been studied by others in the field (Johnson and 
Roth, 2003; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Since the establishment of the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) in 1994 by the federal government, COPS 
has been the major source of funding for local police agencies in implementing 
community policing. In fact, in the fiscal year 2000, COPS spent $685.3 million to assist 
local police departments’ community policing activities (COPS, 2011). Thus, it may not 
be surprising to find that agencies try to focus on specific dimensions of community 
policing strategies to attain federal grants (Worrall and Zhao, 2003). From the standpoint 
of funding agencies, how financial resources are spent should be examined in future 
research.  
Lastly, it is worthwhile to look into other types of specialized units. Not much 
scholarly attention has been paid to the effect of various types of police units—for 
instance, missing child units, cyber-crime units, and research and planning units. Do 
police agencies arrest more cyber criminals when they create cyber-crime units? How 
much faster do police departments process crime scene investigations after they create 
their own crime analysis units? More research is critical to answer these questions. 
Examining police specialized units will definitely increase the understanding of 
organizational behavior and performance by police agencies.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LEMAS ADMINISTRATION 
As noted above, the LEMAS has been a critical tool to comprehend trends across 
police organizations in the United States and their operations. Since its initiation in 1987, 
researchers have utilized the dataset from diverse points of view; studies based on the 
LEMAS have greatly improved the understanding of police organizations. In fact, 
information collected by the LEMAS is an “extraordinary vehicle” to trace the changes of 
police organizations and factors associated with such changes (Langworthy, 2002). 
Nevertheless, despite its common use, the inherent limitations of the data collection 
method and other issues involved in the LEMAS need to be mentioned (Walker and Katz, 
1995). Thus, I will provide a few suggestions for improved administration of the future 
LEMAS.  
First, prior studies showed that false or overstated information was included in the 
LEMAS (e.g., Maguire and Katz, 2002). As shown above, this research also found that 
some respondents did not seem to take care when filling out their questionnaire. 
Therefore, it is critical to develop a tool to guarantee the validity and reliability of data. 
For instance, randomly selected samples may be contacted to verify whether responses 
reflect organizational reality. Further, data may be collected and analyzed by “a neutral 
agency” to decrease respondents’ temptation to paint an overstated picture of their 
organizations (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).  
Second, consistency of the same survey question items included in the earlier 
waves of the LEMAS need to be maintained in future data collection. Of course, a survey 
needs to reflect the change of police organizations and their environment—for instance, 
introduction of new operations (e.g., terrorism prevention) and equipment (e.g., drones) 
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to examine how police departments perform their tasks. However, some key structural 
items (civilian staffs, salary of officers, different types of jobs performed by officers, etc.) 
and operational items (community policing, operation of specialized units, etc.) need to 
be continued in the subsequent surveys. By doing so, researchers can examine the 
temporal patterns of police operations as well as organizational structure. Also, the 
factors that may contribute to such changes can be identified by merging with other data 
sources. In short, longitudinal data analysis from multiple waves of the LEMAS will be 
possible only when data are collected on the same areas of police work.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite some skepticism regarding the specialization of police organizations, the 
history of American policing shows how division of labor has become the norm in many 
police departments. The federal government has created special agencies to carry out 
specially defined tasks when new problems arise (Walker and Katz, 2010). The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives are some examples of such specialized federal agencies. Local 
police departments have also undergone division of labor to deal with new social 
problems as they arise.  
Within this context, this study attempted to show that specialization within the 
community policing era is indeed a reality in American policing in the 21
st
 century. After 
widespread introduction of community policing philosophy, policing scholars have 
highlighted despecialization of organizational structure and personnel. The present 
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research, however, shows that police agencies have increasingly depended on some 
specialized units to deal with specifically defined local problems since the early 2000s.  
Additionally, this dissertation disclosed that a specialized unit may have more 
than symbolic value. That is, specialized units can also be tools for police agencies to 
solve local problems in effective ways. As Smith (1902[1776]:43) argued, “The greatest 
improvement in the productive powers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, 
and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the 
effects of the division of labor.” Thus, it is worthwhile to examine how specialization 
within police agencies contributes to increased effectiveness and/or improved efficiency 
of organizational performance. This results of this dissertation provide a first contribution 
to the research literature in this area.  
Specialization, or division of labor, may reflect broader social changes rather than 
simple organizational devices to show off police leaders’ temporary interests (Durkheim, 
1933). In times when police have to deal with numerous unprecedented challenges within 
their communities, it is time to think over whether a simple dichotomy—specialization 
vs. despecialization (or generalization)—is beneficial for police agencies. Namely, it 
needs to be investigated how community policing and specialization can be compatible in 
daily policing. Thus, policing scholars and police practitioners need to pay more attention 
to this relatively new organizational phenomenon and examine its roles and effects on 
police departments in a more detailed manner.   
120 
 
REFERENCES 
Akins, Scott. 2003. Racial segregation and property crime: Examining the mediating 
effect of police strength. Justice Quarterly 20:675-695.  
Allison, Paul D. 1994. Using panel data to estimate the effects of events. Sociological 
Methods & Research 23:174-199.  
Amburgey, Terry L., and Tina Dacin. 1994. As the left foot follows the right? The 
dynamics of strategic and structural change. Academy of Management Journal 
37:1427-1452. 
Bartholomew, David J., Fiona Steele, Irini Moustaki, and Jane Galbraith. 2008. Analysis 
of Multivariate Social Science Data, 2
nd
 ed. Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall.  
Bayley, David. 1994. Police for the Future. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bell, Jeannine. 2002. Policing Hatred: Law Enforcement, Civil Rights, and Hate Crime. 
New York: New York University Press.  
Blau, Peter M. 1970. A formal theory of differentiation in organizations. American 
Sociological Review 35:201-218.  
Brown, Michael K. 1981. Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of 
Reform. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2011. Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics (LEMAS). Retrieved from 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=248#Methodology. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2007. Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics (LEMAS) 2007, Codebook. Washington, DC: Office of Justice 
Programs. 
Bursik, Robert J., Jr., and Harold Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhoods and Crime: The 
Dimensions of Effective Community Control. New York: Lexington. 
Catalano, Shannan. 2012. Intimate Partner Violence, 1993–2010. Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice. 
Chappell, Allison T., John M. MacDonald, and Patrick W. Manz. 2006. The 
Organizational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions. Crime & Delinquency 
52:287-306.  
121 
 
Child, John. 1973. Predicting and understanding organization structure. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 18:168-185.  
Child, John. 1984. Organization: A Guide to Problems and Practice. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Clift, Raymond E. 1970. A Guide to Modern Police Thinking, 3
rd
 ed. Cincinnati: The 
W.H. Anderson Company.  
Community Policing Consortium. 1994. Understanding Community Policing: A 
Framework for Action. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
Cordner, Gary. 1995. Community policing: Elements and effects. Police Forum 5:1-8. 
Cordner, Gary. 2001. Community policing: Elements and effects. In Critical Issues in 
Policing: Contemporary Readings, 4
th
 ed., eds. Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey 
P. Alpert. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. 
Cordner, Gary. 2004. The survey data: What they say and don’t say about community 
policing. In Community Policing: Past, Present and Future eds. Lorie Fridell and 
Mary Ann Wycoff. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.  
Cordner, Gary, and Kathryn E. Scarborough. 1999. Operationalizing community policing 
in rural America: Sense and nonsense. In Community Oriented Policing and 
Problem Solving: Now and Beyond. Sacramento, CA: California Department of 
Justice.  
Crank, John P. 1989. Civilianization in small and medium police departments in Illinois, 
1973-1986. Journal of Criminal Justice 17:167-177. 
Crank, John P., and Robert Langworthy. 1996. Fragmented centralization and the 
organization of the police. Police and Society 6:213-229.  
Crank, John P., and Robert Langworthy. 1992. An institute perspective of policing. The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 83:338-363.  
Daft, Richard L., and Patricia J. Bradshaw. 1980. The process of horizontal 
differentiation: Two models. Administrative Science Quarterly 25:441-456.   
Davis, Justin T. 2012. Examining perceptions of local law enforcement in the fight 
against crimes with a cyber component. Policing: An International Journal of 
Police Strategies & Management 35:272-284.  
Decker, Scott H. 2007. Expand the use of police gang units. Criminology & Public Policy 
6:729-734. 
122 
 
Dewar, Robert, and Jerald Hage. 1978. Size, technology, complexity, and structural 
differentiation: Toward a theoretical synthesis. Administrative Science Quarterly 
23:111-136.   
Duffee, David McDowell, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 2000. 
Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice: An Introductory Essay. In 
Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice. Volume 4 in the National 
Institute of Justice CJ 2000 series, eds. D. Duffee, D. McDowall, L. Mazerolle, S. 
Mastrofski, B. Crutchfield, and B. Ostrom. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
Eck, John E., and Edward Maguire. 2000. Have changes in policing reduced violent 
crime? An assessment of the evidence. In The crime drop in America, ed. Alfred 
Blumstein and Joel Wallman. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Eck, John E., and Dennis P. Rosenbaum. 1994. The new police order: Effectiveness, 
equity, and efficiency in community policing. In The Challenge of Community 
Policing: Testing the Promises ed. Dennis P. Rosenbaum. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
Enned, Susan T. Ennet, Nancy S. Tobler, Christopher L. Ringwalt, and Robert L. 
Flewelling. 1994. How effective is drug abuse resistance education? A meta-
analysis of project DARE outcome evaluations. American Journal of Public 
Health 84:1394-1401. 
Esbensen, Finn-Aage, and D. Wayne Osgood. 1999. Gang Resistance Education and 
Training (GREAT): Results from the national evaluation. Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 36:194-225.  
Etzioni, Amitai. 1964. Modern Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
Falcone, David N., and L. Edward Wells. 1995. The county sheriff as a distinctive 
policing modality. American Journal of Police 14:123-149 
Filley, Alan C., Robert J. House, and Steven Kerr. 1976. Managerial Process and 
Organizational Behavior, 2
nd
 ed. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company.  
Finkel, Steven E. 2008. Linear panel analysis. In Handbook of Longitudinal Research ed. 
Scott Menard. New York: Elsevier Press.  
Fridell, Lorie. 2004. The defining characteristics of community policing. In Community 
Policing: Past, Present and Future eds. Lorie Fridell and Mary Ann Wycoff. 
Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum.  
123 
 
Giblin, Matthew J. 2006. Structural elaboration and institutional isomorphism: The case 
of crime analysis units. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management 29:643-664.  
Goldstein, Herman. 1987. Toward community-oriented policing: Potential, basic 
requirements, and threshold questions. Crime & Delinquency 33:6-30.  
Marc D. Goodman. 1997. Why the police don't care about computer crime. Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology 10:465-494. 
Greene, Jack R. 2000. Community policing in America: Changing the nature, structure, 
and function of the police. In Criminal Justice 2000: Policies, processes, and 
decisions of the criminal justice system, ed. J. Horney. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice. 
Halaby, Charles N. 2004. Panel models in sociological research: Theory into practice. 
Annual Review of Sociology 30:507-544.  
Hall, David J., and Maurice A. Saias. 1980. Strategy follows structure! Strategic 
Management Journal 1:149-163.  
Hammer, Heather, David Finkelhor, Andrea J. Sedlak, and Lorraine E. Porcellini. 2004. 
National Estimates of Missing Children: Selected Trends, 1988–1999. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
Hatry, Harry P. 2006. Performance Measurement: Getting Results. Washington, DC: The 
Urban Institute Press.  
He, Ni, Jihong Zhao, and Nicholas P. Lovrich. 2005. Community policing: A preliminary 
assessment of environmental impact with panel data on program implementation 
in U.S. cities. Crime & Delinquency 51:295-317.  
Hickman, Matthew J., and Alex R. Piquero. 2009. Organizational, administrative, and 
environmental correlates of complaints about police use of force: Does minority 
representation matter? Crime & Delinquency 55:3-27. 
Katz, Charles M. 2001. The establishment of a police gang unit: An examination of 
organizational and environmental factors. Criminology 39:37-74.  
Katz, Charles M., and Vincent J. Webb. 2004. Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site 
Study. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.  
Katz, Charles M., Edward R. Maguire, and Dennis W. Roncek. 2002. The creation of 
specialized police gang units: A macro-level analysis of contingency, social threat 
124 
 
and resource dependency explanations. Policing: An International Journal of 
Police Strategies & Management 25:472-506.  
Kennedy, David M. 1993. The strategic management of police resources in Perspectives 
on Policing no 14. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.  
Klinger, David. 1997. Negotiating order in patrol work: An ecological theory of police 
response to deviance. Criminology 35:277-306.  
Klinger, David. 2004. Environment and organization: Reviving a perspective on the 
police. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
593:119-136. 
Koper, Christopher S., Edward R. Maguire, Gretchen E. Moore, and David E. Huffer. 
2001. Hiring and Retention Issues in Police Agencies: Readings on the 
Determinants of Police Strength, Hiring and Retention of Officers, and the 
Federal COPS Program. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.  
LaFrance, T. Casey, and MaCherie Placide. 2010. Sheriffs’ and police chiefs’ leadership 
and management decisions in the local law enforcement budgetary process: an 
exploration. International Journal of Police Science and Management 12:238-
255. 
Langton, Lynn. 2010. Census of Law Enforcement Gang Units, 2007: Gang Units in 
Large Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2007. Washington, DC: US Department 
of Justice.  
Langworthy, Robert H. 1985. Wilson's theory of police behavior: A replication of the 
constraint theory. Justice Quarterly 2:89-98. 
Langworthy, Robert H. 1986. The Structure of Police Organizations. New York: Praeger. 
Langworthy, Robert H. 2002. LEMAS: A comparative organizational research platform. 
Justice Research and Policy 4:21-38. 
Lawrence, Paul R., and Jay W. Lorsch. 1967. Organization and Environment. Boston: 
Harvard University.  
Lindgren, Sue A., and Marianne W. Zawitz. 2001. Linking Uniform Crime Reporting 
Data to Other Datasets. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.  
Litterer, Joseph A. 1973. The Analysis of Organizations, 2
nd
 ed. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc.  
125 
 
MacDonald, John M. 2002. The effectiveness of community policing in reducing urban 
violence. Crime and Delinquency 48:592-618.   
Maguire, Edward R. 1997. Structural change in large municipal police organizations 
during the community policing era. Justice Quarterly 14:547-576.  
Maguire, Edward R. 2002. Multivariate establishment surveys of police organizations. 
Justice Research and Policy 4:39-59.  
Maguire, Edward R. 2003. Organizational Structure in American Police Agencies: 
Context, Complexity, and Control. Albany: State University of New York Press.  
Maguire, Edward R. 2009. Police organizational structure and child sexual abuse case 
attrition. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 
32:157-179.  
Maguire, Edward R., and Megan Gantley. 2009a. Specialist and Generalist Models. In 
Implementing Community Policing: Lessons From 12 Agencies, eds. Edward 
Maguire and William Wells. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
Maguire, Edward R., and Megan Gantley. 2009b. Decentralization and Geographic 
Accountability. In Implementing Community Policing: Lessons From 12 
Agencies, eds. Edward Maguire and William Wells. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
Maguire, Edward R., and Charles M. Katz. 2002. Community policing, loose coupling, 
and sensemaking in American police agencies. Justice Quarterly 14:547-576. 
Maguire, Edward R., and William R. King. 2004. Trends in the policing industry. The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593:15-41. 
Maguire, Edward R., and William R. King. 2007. The changing landscape of American 
police organizations. In Exploring the Future of Crime, Communities, and 
Policing, ed. Joseph A. Schafer.  
Maguire, Edward R., and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 2000. Patterns of community policing 
in the United States. Police Quarterly 3:4-45. 
Maguire, Edward R., and Craig Uchida. 2000. Measurement and Explanation in the 
Comparative Study of American Police Organizations. In Measurement and 
Analysis of Crime and Justice, Vol. 4 of Criminal Justice 2000, eds. David 
Duffee. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
126 
 
Maguire, Edward R., and William Wells. 2009. Making Sense of Community Policing. In 
Implementing Community Policing: Lessons From 12 Agencies, eds. Edward 
Maguire and William Wells. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
Maguire, Edward R., Joseph B. Kuhns, Craig D. Uchida, and Stephen M. Cox. 1997. 
Patterns of community policing in nonurban America. Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 34:368-394. 
March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons.  
Mastrofski, Stephen D., and R. Richard Ritti. 2000. Making sense of community 
policing: A theory-based analysis. Police Practice & Research 1:183-210.  
Mastrofski, Stephen, and James J. Willis. 2010. Police organization continuity and 
change: into the twenty-first century. Crime and Justice 39:55-142. 
Menard, Scott W. 2002. Longitudinal Research, 2
nd
 ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
Metropolitan Police Service. 2012. Metropolitan Police Service Organisational Structure. 
Retrieved from http://www.met.police.uk/about/charts/mps-orgchart-mar2012.pdf 
(accessed on 1/31/2013) 
Mintzberg, Henry. 1979. The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.  
Moore, Mark H. 1992. Problem-solving and community policing. In Modern Policing 
eds. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Moore, Mark H. 1994. Research synthesis and policy implications. In The Challenge of 
Community Policing: Testing the Promises ed. Dennis P. Rosenbaum. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2009. Building Trust Between the 
Police and the Citizens They Serve: An Internal Affairs Promising Practices 
Guide for Local Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: Department of Justice. 
Osgood, D. Wayne, Barbara J. McMorris, and Maria T. Potenza. 2002. Analyzing 
multiple-item measures of crime and deviance I: Item response theory scaling. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 18:267-296.  
Parks, Roger B., Stephen D. Mastrofski, Christina DeJong, and M. Kevin Gray. 1999. 
How officers spend their time with the community. Justice Quarterly 16:483-518. 
127 
 
Paternoster, Raymond, Robert Brame, Paul Mazerolle, and Alex Piquero. 1998. Using the 
correct statistical test for the equality of regression coefficients. Criminology 
36:859-866. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey. 1982. Organizations and Organization Theory. Boston: Pitman.  
Reiss, Albert J. Jr. 1992. Police Organization in the Twentieth Century. In Modern 
Policing: Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 15, eds. Michael Tonry 
and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Roberts, Aki, and John M. Roberts, Jr. 2006. Police Innovations and the Structure of 
Informal Communication Between Police Agencies: Network and LEMAS Data. 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
Robinson, Amanda L., and Meghan Stroshine Chandek. 2000. Philosophy into practice? 
Community policing units and domestic violence victim participation. Policing: 
An international Journal of Police Strategies & Management 23:280-302.  
Rosenbaum, Dennis P., Arthur J. Lurigio, and Robert C. Davis. 1998. The Prevention of 
Crime: Social and Situational Strategies. Belmont: West/Wadsworth Publishing 
Company.  
Rutherford, Sandra L., Kristie R. Blevins, and Vivian B. Lord. 2008. An evaluation of the 
effects of a street crime unit on citizens’ fear of crime. Professional Issues in 
Criminal Justice 3:21-36. 
Sandholtz, Nathan, Lynn Langton, and Michael Planty. 2013. Hate Crime Victimization, 
2003-2011. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.  
Scott, W. Richard. 1975. Organizational structure. Annual Review of Sociology 1:1-20. 
Scott, W. Richard. 2003. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Skogan, Wesley G. 1994. The impact of community policing on neighborhood residents: 
A cross-site analysis. In The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the 
Promises ed. Dennis P. Rosenbaum. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Skogan, Wesley G. 2004. Community policing: Common impediments to succeed. In 
Community Policing: Past, Present and Future eds. Lorie Fridell and Mary Ann 
Wycoff. Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum.  
Skogan, Wesley G. 2006. Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
128 
 
Skogan, Wesley G., and Kathleen Frydl. (Eds.). 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in 
Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academies. 
Skogan, Wesley G., and Susan M. Hartnett. 1997. Community Policing, Chicago Style. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Skolnick, Jerome H., and David H. Bayley. 1986. The New Blue Line: Police Innovation 
in Six American Cities. New York: Free Press. 
Skolnick, Jerome H., and David H. Bayley. 1988. Theme and variation in community 
policing. Crime and Justice 10:1-37.  
Smith, Adam. 1902 [1776]. The Wealth of Nations Introduction by Alan B. Krueger. New 
York: Collier and Son. 
Snyder, Howard N., and Melissa Sickmund. 2006. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 
National Report. Washington, DC: National Center for Juvenile Justice.  
Speirs, Verne L. 1998. The Police and Missing Children: Findings From a National 
Survey. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.  
St. Louis Police Department. 2013. Metropolitan Police Department – City of St. Louis 
Organizational Chart. Retrieved from 
http://www.slmpd.org/images/org_chart.pdf (accessed on 1/31/2013) 
Staft, Joseph J. 1980. Effects of organizational design on communication between patrol 
and investigative functions. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 49:1-7. 
Stucky, Thomas D. 2005. Local politics and police strength, Justice Quarterly 22:139-
169. 
Taylor, Frederick Winslow. 1947. Scientific Management. New York: Harper & 
Brothers.  
Thompson, Victor A. 1961. Modern Organization. New York: Alfred A Knopf.  
Trojanowicz, Robert, and Bonnie Bucqueroux. 1998. Community Policing: How to Get 
Started, 2nd ed. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing.  
Vito, Gennaro F., William F. Walsh, and Julie Kunselman. 2005. Community policing: 
The middle manager’s perspective. Police Quarterly 8:490-511.  
Walker, Samuel, and Charles M. Katz. 1995. Less than meets the eye: Police department 
bias-crime units. American Journal of Police 14:29-48. 
129 
 
Walker, Samuel, and Charles M. Katz. 2010. The Police in America: An Introduction, 7th 
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities. 
Webb, Vincent J., and Charles M. Katz. 2003. Policing gangs in an era of community 
policing. In Policing Gangs and Youth Violence, ed. Scott H. Decker. Belmont: 
Wadsworth. 
Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New 
York: Bedminster Press.  
Weisburd, David, and John Eck. 2004. What can police do to reduce crime, disorder and 
fear. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593:42-65. 
Weisel, Deborah Lamm, and Tara O’Connor Shelley. 2004. Specialized Gang Units: 
Form and Function in Community Policing. Washington, DC: National Institute 
of Justice.  
Wells, L. Edward, and David N. Falcone. 2000. Policing in the United States: 
Developing a Comprehensive Empirical Model. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice.  
Wilson, James Q. 1968. Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and 
Order in Eight Communities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Wilson, Jeremy M. 2004. A measurement model approach to estimating community 
policing implementation. Justice Research and Policy 6:1-24.  
Wilson, O. W., and Roy Clinton McLaren. 1972. Police Administration, 3rd ed. New 
York: McGraw-Hill.  
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2012. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 5
th
 ed. 
Mason: South-Western.  
 
  
130 
 
APPENDIX 1. MERGING THREE WAVES OF THE LEMAS 
 
 The procedure of constructing the dataset for the present study was composed of 
two stages. First, the LEMAS 2000 and 2003 have the same identifying code that makes 
it possible to merge the two datasets: Agency ID. Agency ID is a 16-digit code, and 
merging two datasets is possible by matching the code. Thus, the LEMAS “2000/2003” 
was produced by merging the two datasets using a variable name AGENCYID.  
Merging the LEMAS 2007 with the 2000/2003 dataset was more complicated. 
The LEMAS 2007 does not have the Agency ID code that is available in the LEMAS 
2000 and 2003. Rather, it has other ID codes not included in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003. 
For instance, the LEMAS 2007 contains the Originating Reporting Identification (ORI) 
code. The ORI code was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to link the 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and other data source (Wells and Falcone, 2005). Also 
included is a Survey ID that is unique to the each wave of the LEMAS. 
 The LEMAS 2000 and 2003 also have other ID codes. For instance, the LEMAS 
2000 and 2003 have Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) that are five-digit 
codes. Also included is the six digit numerical Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) code. 
However, the LEMAS 2007 does not have all these codes. Therefore, without any linking 
tool or dataset, it is not possible to merge the 2000/2003 dataset with the LEMAS 2007.  
The Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk File (referred to as 
Crosswalk hereafter) was helpfully developed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the 
National Archive of Criminal Justice Data in 2000 to solve these hurdles in combining 
several datasets (Lindgren and Zawitz, 2001). Before the introduction of the Crosswalk, 
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matching different datasets in criminal justice areas with other socioeconomic data was 
limited or challenging. However, the Crosswalk makes it possible for researchers to 
merge diverse datasets to conduct agency-level analyses. For instance, the UCR can be 
merged with US Census data and LEMAS through ID codes included in the Crosswalk. 
So far, three versions of the Crosswalk (1996, 2000, and 2005) have been produced by 
BJS, and all three are publicly accessible through the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research.  
To merge the LEMAS 2000/2003 and 2007 dataset, I chose the most recent 
Crosswalk file—Crosswalk 2005. Among ID codes included in the Crosswalk 2005 are 
ORI codes and AGENCY ID codes. The latter codes are the same codes that are used in 
the LEMAS 2000 and 2007. Thus, by matching the LEMAS 2007 and the Crosswalk 
2005 using ORI codes, the merged file now included the AGENCY ID variable, which 
enabled me to merge with the LEMAS 2000/2003. The matching process is shown in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Procedure for Merging Datasets  
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APPENDIX 2. RECODING SOME CASES 
 
Prior studies indicated that police agencies “over-respond” to some questions 
when filling out the LEMAS survey (e.g., Walker and Katz, 1995). That is, even when 
police departments did not have a specific subunit, some survey respondents tend to 
answer in a socially desirable way. For instance, when the community policing 
philosophy has attracted a favorable response from community members and politicians, 
it is likely that survey respondents may say that their agencies have a community policing 
unit when, in fact, they do not.  
The survey instrument for this item is relatively clear and obvious. The question 
in the LEMAS asks if the police department “has specialized unit with full-time 
personnel to address this problem/task,” followed by a list of subunits including 
community policing units. In spite of clarity of the question, it is possible that some 
agencies did not provide correct information on this item intentionally or unintentionally. 
It is theoretically possible for researchers to check the reliability of answers by contacting 
police organizations. Obviously, this verification is costly and time-consuming to check 
the reliability of all the answers in the dataset. Thus, I decided to use an indicator item in 
the LEMAS to verify if agencies that answered they had a community policing unit really 
did have such a unit.  
In the early part of the LEMAS survey, it asks police organizations the number of 
community policing officers, community relations officers, or other sworn personnel who 
are “specifically designated” to community policing activities. Thus, agencies without 
such officers are expected not to have community policing units. In other words, agencies 
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that answered none in the number of community policing officers are supposed to check 
“No Community Policing Unit.” If, however, agencies answered that they had separate 
community policing units though they did not have any community policing personnel, it 
is safe to say that the police departments did not provide correct information. There were 
20 agencies (15 in the LEMAS 2003 and 5 in the LEMAS 2007) that were identified as 
having provided misleading data. I recoded these cases as “No CP Unit.”  
Visual check of the data also revealed some interesting points. For instance, 
according to the data, the Laredo Police Department in Laredo, Texas, had a CP Unit in 
2000 with 205 community policing officers, but did not have a CP unit in 2003 and only 
reported seven designated officers. In 2007, the number of officers remained the same, 
but the agency had a CP Unit. Also, Salt Lake City Police Department had a CP Unit in 
2003 with eight community policing officers, but in 2007, the department did not report a 
CP Unit although the number of officers increased to 30. It is possible that agencies 
eliminated their formal CP Units and subsequently increased the number of officers 
committed to community policing activities. Also, the creation of CP Units does not 
necessarily mean that such agencies increase number of personnel in implementing the 
tasks. Therefore, I assumed the data to be true in these cases. Recoded cases are shown in 
Table A.1.  
Thus, I matched the item with other indicator of community policing units in the 
survey. The LEMAS survey from 2000 to 2007 included a question asking the number of 
community policing officers or other officers who were “specifically designated to 
engage in community policing activities.” Therefore, if a police department answered “0” 
on the number of community policing officers, but answered “Yes” on the item of 
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community policing unit, the mismatch represents an error (intentional or unintentional). 
When I checked this issue, I uncovered 20 cases (or police agencies) that did not answer 
consistently.  
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Table A.1. Recoded Police Agencies (n=20) 
NUM2000 NUM2003 NUM2007 CP Units2000 CP Units2003 CP Units07 NAME OF AGENCY CITY/COUNTY STATE 
20 0 20 YES NO* NO OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF Martinez CA 
0 0 0 NO NO* NO MONTEREY COUNTY Salinas CA 
101 0 0 NO NO NO* GARDEN GROVE POLICE DEPARTMENT Garden Grove CA 
432 0 40 NO NO* YES SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT Sacramento CA 
19 0 6 YES NO* YES SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFFS San Bernardino CA 
10 0 10 YES NO* YES SAN BERNARDINO POLICE DEPARTMENT San Bernardino CA 
11 12 0 NO YES NO* DANBURY POLICE DEPARTMENT Danbury CT 
6 0 248 YES NO* NO MACOMB COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE Mount Clemens MI 
2 0 0 NO NO* NO OAKLAND COUNTRY SHERIFFS OFFICE Pontiac MI 
151 6 0 YES YES NO* DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT Detroit MI 
3 0 3 YES NO* YES BLOOMINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT Bloomington MN 
18 21 0 YES YES NO* GULFPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT Gulfport MS 
11 0 8 YES NO* NO JACKSON POLICE DEPARTMENT Jackson MS 
99 0 12 YES NO* NO GUILFORD COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE Greensboro NC 
35 0 250 YES NO* NO PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT Providence RI 
319 0 4 YES NO* NO CHATTANOOGA POLICE DEPARTMENT Chattanooga TN 
36 28 0 YES YES NO* HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE Houston TX 
5 0 1 NO NO* YES CLARK COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE Vancouver WA 
0 0 4 NO NO* YES VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT Vancouver WA 
8 0 111 NO NO* NO FEDERAL WAY POLICE DEPARTMENT Federal Way WA 
NOTE: NUM2000 denotes the number of community policing officers in 2000.  
* denotes recoded cases from YES to NO due to inconsistent answers in the data.  
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APPENDIX 3. Z SCORES FROM COMPARISONS OF 
COEFFICIENTS 
 
Table A.3.1. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Community Engagement) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.31 -0.002 
Police Strength 0.12 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.861 
Occup. Diff. 0.02 0.01* 0.03 0.01** -0.751 
Budget -0.46 0.63 -0.71 0.54 0.385 
Crime Rate 35.75 48.75 -3.91 10.69 0.795 
n 384  860   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table A.3.2. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Problem-Solving) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units -0.33 0.28 0.33 0.20 -1.929 
Police Strength -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 -1.596 
Occup. Diff. -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.284 
Budget -0.77 0.38* -0.06 0.35 -1.354 
Crime Rate 14.71 29.64  -12.02 6.84 0.877 
n 384  862   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table A.3.3. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Organizational Transformation) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units 0.30 0.19 0.32 0.13* -0.093 
Police Strength -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 -1.509 
Occup. Diff. 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00** 1.341 
Budget -0.18 0.28 -0.15 0.23 -0.059 
Crime Rate 54.35 23.93* 1.48 4.69 2.193 
n 361  842   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table A.3.4. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Community Engagement) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units 0.73 0.50 1.14 0.25** -0.739 
Police Strength 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.121 
Occup. Diff. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -1.113 
Budget -0.40 0.51 -0.17 0.36 -3.504 
Crime Rate -30.37 43.82 -7.80 8.73 -0.505 
n 385  864   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table A.3.5. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Problem-Solving) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units 0.67 0.21** 0.45 0.11** 4.020 
Police Strength 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.189 
Occup. Diff. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.178 
Budget 0.18 0.21 0.03 0.16 0.577 
Crime Rate -26.88 18.43 3.73 3.94 -1.624 
n 387  865   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table A.3.6. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and 
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Organizational Transformation) 
 Sheriffs’ Department Municipal Police Department  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. z score 
CP Units 0.52 0.20** 0.35 0.11** 0.748 
Police Strength -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 -1.592 
Occup. Diff. 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.514 
Budget 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.16 -0.775 
Crime Rate 20.12 20.22 -3.80 4.04 1.160 
n 355  831   
NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged 
operating budget.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
 
 
